Lingling Wei

So ever since Trump left office, Xi Jinping has tried to build up this arsenal of retaliatory tools. And not only that, he has doubled down on central control over China's economy. China has invested so much more in high tech, in industrial capabilities and all that. Basically, the goal is to fortify the economy against potential sanctions from the United States.

It's not high-end semiconductors or other stuff. It's really things like rare earth minerals, the kind of components that U.S. companies need to use in order to make trips, in order to make defense-related products.

They have a lot of incentives, a lot of reasons to project strengths as opposed to, you know, project weakness. So that's why we are seeing that Xi Jinping is standing very firm. He's not calling President Trump. He's not, like other countries, trying to negotiate with Trump because he feels like we cannot do this under such maximum pressure. That would make us look weak.

Because politically speaking, looking weak would be very costly for authoritarian leadership.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has been preparing for this moment for many years.

Yes, I think China will retaliate. That's my bet.

Given how high the U.S. tariffs on China are right now, basically the U.S. market is closed to China. So China will have a very, very hard time selling to the United States. That would obviously hurt China's growth even more. Both countries' economy is at stake, and also global economy is at stake as well. We're talking about two ginormous powers fighting against each other.

The impact, the direct impact, indirect impact, ripple effects, you know, just everywhere.

The Chinese felt pretty good about the new administration. There was actually a sense of cautious optimism. That was because right before the inauguration day, President Trump actually invited President Xi Jinping to go to Washington to attend a ceremony. So, you know, that looked pretty good to Beijing.

And at the same time, despite Trump's campaign promise to hit China with 60 percent tariffs, he actually held off doing that on day one. So there were, you know, some really kind of warm and fuzzy signs at the very beginning.

It was quite to the dismay of the Chinese leadership. Rubio was actually picked and confirmed as the Secretary of State. He's quite a foe, and now he's taking a very important position in the administration. But, you know, you just have to deal with it.

Basically, you know, the message was, even though we don't like you, we're sort of like foes, but we're still willing to get down to business with you.

Based on the official readout, Chinese readout of the call, Wang Yi basically issued quite a warning to Rubio. The term Wang Yi used was that can be translated into something like behave yourself, right? So it was, you know, basically Wang Yi lectured Rubio during the call.

So the White House obviously took notice of that. And, you know, that really put the Chinese on a bad start. That kind of really didn't go well with the administration.

The Chinese definitely were trying to engage with the administration at that point of time. In fact, they have been trying to get to the core team of the Trump administration. They really want to talk to cabinet-level officials. However, they have had no luck whatsoever. Some lower-level communication has been taking place. However, higher-level communication really has gone dark.

Sure. So in late February, the foreign minister we just talked about, Wang Yi, he flew to New York. On the surface, you know, he was here to attend a United Nations Security Council meeting, but there was a much bigger goal for him. which was to have a meeting with senior officials at the Trump administration.

In particular, Foreign Minister Wang Yi wanted to talk to National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, but he had no luck. He didn't get a meeting with him. He didn't even get a call with him.

The Trump administration, to their credit, they know China pretty well these days. They know who in China is more important than others. And they basically told the Chinese, OK, you want to talk? Sure. But we want to talk to the people who are really close to Xi Jinping. But to the Chinese, that demand was something they couldn't really agree to because that's not how China works.

You know, they have very established ways of doing things and they didn't want to improvise or they did not have the ability to improvise. So basically, what China is offering for conversations is not in line with who the Trump administration wants to talk to.

Especially on China's part, they definitely made quite a big effort.

Oh, I better watch out what I tweet.

Yeah.

Like everyone else. I think everybody was surprised.

That was quite a shock to people in Beijing. And they did expect the Trump administration to do something to increase tariffs even further. But the magnitude of the tariff increase completely surprised the Chinese leadership.

There has been quite a sense of shock, frustration, and anger in Beijing. That's our colleague Lingling Wei.

This time around, they also hit back quite hard. They put retaliatory tariffs on all American products with no exception.

And they have done quite a lot. It's not just one thing. So what Beijing is doing right now is kind of deploying a very broad set of countermeasures to engage in this economic warfare with the United States.

Yes, they definitely do. And they started to put together this playbook ever since Trump left office in 2020. So Xi Jinping's government has been preparing for another Trump-like assault for all those years. And all sorts of tools are all aimed at hitting the United States where it hurts. A lot of people just cannot produce stuff these days without Chinese components, right?

For medicine that we consume here, for iPhones, right? And for chips, they all require components from China, right?

Well, it all comes down to who buckles from the pain first. For now, the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, has shown no sign of backing down. If anything, he's doubling down.

Right now, because Trump's trade war is much broader than just with China, right, the risk is that a lot of other countries will be pushed into the arms of the Chinese. So China definitely has an opportunity to try to win over some of the traditional allies and partners of the United States.

This is the worst case scenario for China. That makes very clear who is the main target for the Trump administration is China. And that makes it very, very, very difficult for China to negotiate with other countries to try to have any kind of alignment to confront the United States. So it's really the worst case scenario for Beijing right now.

I do believe the U.S. has the upper hand with this move. The U.S. actually has quite some leverage over China, mainly based on how strong the U.S. economy is.

I think right now still too early to say. Both of them have shown their resolve and capacity to hit back at each other. But China has its own cards as well, right? Its political system, you know, such an authoritarian system. That means its leadership doesn't to be held accountable. They definitely are in a better position to play the long game.

An offering for Xi Jinping would be pausing the tariff increases or even just Trump picking up the phone to call Xi Jinping. I bet if Trump takes the initiative, makes a call, Xi Jinping would pick it up. Because after all, economic pressure in China is building even before the trade war started and now even more so.

So Xi Jinping definitely still has incentives to deal, to negotiate, to have dialogue. What Xi Jinping wants to avoid at the end of the day is to get isolated by Trump's policies.

But to present that story, Chin Gang had to build relationships in D.C. And that was tough going.

Here's Danny, one of the former diplomats we heard from earlier.

What? Why did they refuse to meet with him?

At that time, President Biden had recently come into the White House. But the change in administration didn't change much about the U.S.-China relationship. The two countries were still at odds over a long list of issues. Taiwan, trade, espionage. And the disputes were getting personal. The new U.S.

A photo from the day shows Qin and Rudenko striding out of a building mid-conversation. Qin is tall with rimless glasses. He looks relaxed and confident. And he had reason to be. Qin was foreign minister, the country's top diplomat. He was a member of the upper echelon of the political elite, and he had the backing of China's powerful leader, Xi Jinping.

A little quid pro quo.

A State Department spokesperson said Ambassador Burns has had good access to Chinese officials during his tenure, but that there have been times when Chinese officials have refused to meet with him. Chin was trying to find his footing in the D.C. scene. But even amongst his colleagues, Chin wasn't always popular.

Chin was married, and he had a son. But according to Lingling's sources, Chin also had affairs.

Chin did have Xi's trust. So much so that at the end of 2022, less than two years into Chin's ambassadorship, Xi handed him another promotion. Foreign minister. One of China's most important political posts.

Yeah.

His lonely Washington life was suddenly transformed with people returning his phone calls.

In fact, Ling Ling's reporting shows Chin wasn't the Foreign Ministry's first pick for the job. He wasn't even their second or third pick.

Then, a few months later, Xi tacked on yet another fancy title. He made Qin not just foreign minister, but state counselor, basically elevating Qin to a senior position in his cabinet. Qin's predecessor had waited five years before getting that promotion.

What did that promotion say to you?

So then it's July of last year. Chin's been foreign minister for about half a year. And people start to notice that he's sort of gone missing. What happens from there?

Qin had risen high and was expected to keep rising. But instead, after that day in June, Qin disappeared.

And then, in September of last year, Lingling got a scoop. She reported that the Chinese government had conducted an investigation into Chin, and senior Chinese officials were briefed on it.

When Lingling published her story about Qin's investigation last year, she didn't know what that something else was.

Chinese politics are steeped in secrecy. Even people within the Chinese government might only know parts of Qin's story. the parts the leadership wanted them to know. But Lingling kept digging, and she did have one thread to pull on. According to her sources, senior Chinese officials were told that Chin had been investigated because of an affair, but not just any affair.

They were told that this affair could have compromised China's national security. My ears perked up.

Fu Xiaotian, a rising star in her own profession, with friends in high places, who would face a downfall just as mysterious as Qin Gang's. That's next time on The Missing Minister. Listen to episodes two and three now. They're already in your feed. The Missing Minister is part of The Journal, which is a co-production of Spotify and The Wall Street Journal. I'm your host, Kate Limbaugh.

This series was produced by Annie Minoff and Alan Rodriguez-Espinosa. It was reported by Maria Byrne and Ling Ling Wei. It was edited by Maria Byrne. Mary Mathis is our fact checker. Sound design and mixing by Griffin Tanner. Music direction by Nathan Singapak. Music in this episode by Nathan Singapak and Blue Dot Sessions. Our theme music is by So Wiley and remixed by Nathan Singapak.

Special thanks to Catherine Brewer, Elena Cherney, Laura Morris, Falana Patterson, Sarah Platt, Heather Rogers, and Aruna Vishwanatha. Thanks for listening.

Online, people were asking, Where is Qin Gang? Qin Gang, where did he go? Foreign journalists in Beijing began pressing China's foreign ministry for answers.

The foreign ministry didn't provide any clear explanation. And now, over a year after Qin Gang vanished, he still hasn't been seen in public. We asked the foreign ministry about Chin's whereabouts and the circumstances of his disappearance, and they had no comment. When Chin Gong disappeared, do you remember what your reaction was?

Such a swift fall of a protege of Xi Jinping? Lingling says it stood out as unusual. She couldn't explain it. So she started digging. Over the last year, she's spoken to dozens of people.

And she's been reporting back to us along the way.

This story is about Qin Gang, a Chinese political star whose rise was abruptly cut short. But it's also a story about the man who elevated him in the first place, the man who has ruled China with an iron fist for over a decade, Xi Jinping. And what we've discovered gives us a peek behind the veil of one of the most opaque and powerful governments in the world.

The last day that Qin Gang, China's then foreign minister, was seen in public was on June 25th of last year. It was a hot, humid day in Beijing. And according to his official schedule, Qin spent some of that day carrying out his foreign minister duties as usual. Mostly, this meant meeting other foreign ministers.

From the Journal, I'm Kate Limbaugh, and this is The Missing Minister, a three-part investigation into the mysterious disappearance of China's foreign minister. Episode 1, The Vanishing of Qin Gang. When Qin Gang vanished, he was at the peak of his power. At 57, he was one of China's youngest ever foreign ministers.

But we talked to someone who knew him when he was still at the very bottom of the political ladder. What I remember about Qin Gong was, first of all, I remember him as tall, but I'm pretty short, so that's relative. Sarah Lubman was a reporter in China back in the late 80s and early 90s.

She worked at an American news agency called UPI, covering, among other things, the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. It was at UPI that Sarah got to know the future foreign minister. Chin was in his 20s then, a low-level government worker assigned to UPI. His job was to help journalists like Sarah navigate China, to translate, book trips, and monitor Chinese news.

Sarah and Chin worked together in a converted apartment in one of Beijing's diplomatic compounds.

But Sarah says translators like Chin weren't just there to be helpful. They were also there to keep an eye on UPI's journalists.

Really?

Sarah realized even then that Chin was operating below his potential, that given the chance, he could go far. She just didn't realize how far.

There's an expectation about how you rise through the Chinese political ranks. And it's not generally a fast process. You're supposed to put in your time and move up rung by rung. That's how most of Qin's career at the foreign ministry went.

He did various stints at the Chinese embassy in London, and he worked as a foreign ministry spokesperson in Beijing, where he responded to reporters' questions with scripted talking points. But then, something happened that would put Qin on the fast track. He got a new job and a new boss, one who did things differently.

That's chief China correspondent Lingling Wei. Qin and the Sri Lankan foreign minister discussed China's Belt and Road Initiative. They shook hands and snapped a picture in front of their country's flags.

Soon after Xi came to power, Qin landed a job that would put him in close proximity to Xi. In 2014, Qin became Xi's chief of protocol at the foreign ministry.

That's Danny Russell. He was a diplomat at the State Department during the Obama administration. And he worked with Chin a few times when Chin was chief of protocol. Like in 2015, when Chin accompanied Xi on his first official visit to the U.S. Do you remember any stories from Chin Gang at that time?

Wow. Another person familiar with the rough and tumble of official visits is former U.S. diplomat Rick Waters.

Rick was working at the State Department when tensions with China were ratcheting up during the Trump administration. He helped organize President Trump's visit to Beijing in 2017. And there was one moment during that visit that stuck with him. It happened when Chinese security stopped a U.S. military aide from entering a meeting room.

And on that visit, did you notice anything about how Chin handled that moment and sort of the tensions between Trump and Xi at the time?

Qin wasn't in the room where the big policy decisions were being made. Not yet. But as chief of protocol, he earned Xi's trust. And with Xi's backing, he would be catapulted to the highest echelons of China's political system and on to the global stage. That's next. In 2021, Qin Gang arrived in Washington, D.C. to start a new job.

Another handshake, another picture, in front of another set of flags.

Standing between Chinese and American flags, Qin made his first remarks as China's new man in D.C.

For Chin, it was an important promotion. Just three years earlier, he'd been chief of protocol at the Foreign Ministry. Now, he was Beijing's voice in Washington.

For now, nothing has been decided. The administration officials have told us that whatever action the Trump administration takes wouldn't be unilateral. They would also want to see some action from China as well to lower tariffs. So for the Trump administration, at least a couple of options are on the table right now. One involves reducing the current very, very high tariffs of 145%.

on Chinese imports to between roughly 50% and 65%. Another approach involves adopting a tiered system, similar to some legislation proposed by the House Committee on China late last year. Under that approach, the tariffs would be reduced to 35% for non-strategic products, Basically, things that are not considered the threat to U.S. national security.

And at least 100 percent tariffs for items deemed strategic to U.S. interests.

China has indicated that they're willing to talk, but they do not want to talk under a lot of pressure. The signaling is being viewed positively in Beijing. Now comes the hard part, how to get the negotiations process started.

President Trump is signaling willingness to de-escalate because he clearly is coming under pressure. What he's considering right now is a small positive sign for de-escalation, but it doesn't fundamentally change the overall dynamics with China. Even if the tariffs come down to, say, 50%, 60%, that still means the U.S. market is largely closed to Chinese. exporters.

So fundamentally, it doesn't change the overall picture, but it's a move. And now the ball is in China's court.

Thank you.

What he's considering right now is a small positive sign for de-escalation, but it doesn't fundamentally change the overall dynamics with China. But it's a move, and now the ball is in China's court.

Xi originally planned to use the issues over Chinese interests in the Panama Canal as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Trump administration. But the deal basically pulled rock out from under him even before any negotiations started.

The deal is a huge loss of face for Xi Jinping, China's authoritarian leader. Our reporting shows that Xi originally planned to use the issues over Chinese interests in the Panama Canal as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Trump administration. But the deal basically pulled the rug out from under him even before any negotiations started.

On the other hand, as you pointed out, President Trump quickly celebrated this deal as a victory over Chinese interests in America's backyard. So round one in this US-China battle for global influence, Beijing suffered a setback. In addition, if the deal does get finalized, China is worried that Chinese ships might face restrictions, surcharges and sanctions.

Despite the top leader's anger, he doesn't really have a very simple way to torpedo the deal because the assets to be sold are all outside mainland China and Hong Kong. And at this moment, we have told by both parties of the deal that they are still very confident that it can be completed. But for sure, the pressure is mounting.

The question now a lot of people are asking is whether or not China or the Hong Kong government would try to block the deal for national security reasons.

Geopolitical competition between China and the United States is definitely heating up. The fact of the matter is China's economy is not really doing that well. So economically speaking, the United States does have certain leverage over China. However, Beijing's anger over this Hutchinson deal It's one example of intensifying competition between those two powers.

The strong reaction from Beijing shows that they are going to fight back at every turn. They're not going to just sit idle and do nothing. And they do have levers to pull, including those over American companies operating in China. and China's control of critical minerals. So no doubt it will be a roller coaster ride ahead.

Thank you for having me.

Right. What really jumped out at me is how Xi Jinping wants a different kind of negotiation than the one in the first Trump term. Back then, Xi Jinping's chief trade negotiator was someone who was trained by Harvard, was known as a very pro-market pragmatist. who really understood US concerns. And fast forward to today, Xi Jinping himself really wants to play hardball with the United States.

And then his chief negotiator is someone who thinks just like him, who believes in state planning, believes in central government control and has a clear mandate of not catering to the US.

Unlike previous Chinese officials in task with dealing with foreign governments and especially American officials, He Lifeng doesn't speak English and he doesn't have as much of experience dealing with Americans as some of his predecessors did.

He's quite different from a lot of so-called barbarian handlers in China who were English-speaking, more exposed to Western way of thinking and sometimes considered maybe even a little bit too sympathetic to Western concerns. He really has been staunchly defending China's industrial policy and refused to admit that China has an overcapacity problem.

He told American officials that the fact that we're selling so much cheap stuff to the rest of the world should be viewed as a positive. By comparison, his predecessor, the previous trade negotiator for Xi Jinping, Liu He, he really acknowledged the problems with China's industrial policy and how that policy has led to waste and inefficiencies in China.

One big powerful new weapon the Chinese have realized that they have is export controls. That might sound really counterintuitive because export controls have traditionally been a big tool by the United States, right? The U.S. has significantly tightened export controls on sale of technology, high-tech products to China. And the Chinese have learned the American way.

But their export controls are aimed at rare earths and critical minerals US companies need to use to produce semiconductors, EVs or even fighter jets. So the Chinese really have already used export controls as a very potent tool to hit back at the US and will continue to use that as leverage in future negotiations.

Right, exactly. Xi Jinping has significantly beefed up the country's self-reliance. They believe they're in a better position to drive a harder bargain. If the US wants China to buy more stuff from the United States, the Chinese would argue, okay, you need to sell us stuff we really want to buy, such as semiconductors and other high-end technology products.

They believe they're in a better position to drive a harder bargain. If the U.S. wants China to buy more stuff from the United States, the Chinese would argue, okay, you need to sell us stuff we really want, such as semiconductors.

As the competition between China and the West, especially the United States, intensifies, it really is important how big your friend circle is.

Even within China, we have heard bankers complaining about being asked to finance projects that have very little prospect of returns. Those loans are not free, right? We were told that based on our conversations with bankers in China, some banks really, they have threatened to stop supporting certain projects unless regulators let them clarify that those loans were, quote,

policy instructed, that means, you know, the banks wouldn't be held accountable for defaults, for loan losses.

The biggest takeaway from this study is Made in China 2025 plan has been a big success for China's leader, Xi Jinping. China has significantly reduced its reliance on imports. in pretty much every sector targeted by this plan, including information technology, power equipment, new energy products, new materials, medical devices, you name it.

And another takeaway from the study is the finding that not only China is becoming less reliant on foreign products. It has also become more competitive globally, gaining market shares from foreign companies, especially in sectors like shipbuilding and robotics.

This study is a very timely report for the Trump administration at a time when they and China are preparing for potential negotiations over trade and other economic matters. If you remember, Alex, in 2018, 2019, when the two countries fought the first trade war. Meeting China 2025 was central focus for the Trump administration back then.

Trump officials really tried to get Beijing to address concerns raised by the plan, such as subsidies and other practices involving pressuring foreign companies. In the end, both sides cut a trade deal in early 2020 However, that deal was mostly focused on how to get China to buy more U.S. products and didn't really fundamentally address issues raised by this Made in China 2025 plan.

And fast forward to today, as both sides are edging toward new negotiations, many U.S. companies are hoping that the Trump administration will try to confront China over is industrial policy.