Lloyd Blankfein

We were the biggest M&A franchise.

And so we made commitments.

Those were outstanding.

Those were commitments that were, you know, had to be.

But we marked them down and made analogies.

And we also had a very separate portfolio.

I'll say this word, I hate to say it, bureaucracy in the firm, away from the investors and the traders.

They were partners.

They got paid a lot of money to mark those things.

And when there was a dispute, we always sided with that side of the house.

And we said to the traders and investors, very easy way for you to challenge the marks that you're being given.

Go out and sell something.

Sell a fraction.

And guess what?

And that's what got it.

That was mark-to-market.

is not just a P&L system, it's a risk management system.

Because we, that was our early warning that something was amiss here.

We had things that were marked, things that were triple A. When we made people sell them, the bids vanished.

And they weren't there, and the bids were much lower, and then much lower, and then much lower.