Mark Carney

Absolutely. So what I think the U.S. is risking, first of all, is having less leverage and less of a relationship with some of the most powerful and prosperous economies in the world, less ability to count on these countries. for other strategic issues around the world? Would European countries willingly fight alongside the United States in Afghanistan the next time?

Absolutely. So what I think the U.S. is risking, first of all, is having less leverage and less of a relationship with some of the most powerful and prosperous economies in the world, less ability to count on these countries. for other strategic issues around the world? Would European countries willingly fight alongside the United States in Afghanistan the next time?

Hard to say in the current environment. For the most part, the Europeans have tended to side with the United States when the chips are down. A very conspicuous example of this is Europe's use of Huawei, the giant Chinese telecom company, to build its 5G networks.

Hard to say in the current environment. For the most part, the Europeans have tended to side with the United States when the chips are down. A very conspicuous example of this is Europe's use of Huawei, the giant Chinese telecom company, to build its 5G networks.

Back in 2020, Britain yielded to requests from the first Trump administration not to allow Huawei into its 5G network for national security reasons. If the same decision were to come up today and the U.S. was no longer the steadfast ally it had been, would Britain make a different decision? It's possible.

Back in 2020, Britain yielded to requests from the first Trump administration not to allow Huawei into its 5G network for national security reasons. If the same decision were to come up today and the U.S. was no longer the steadfast ally it had been, would Britain make a different decision? It's possible.

So both on a security level and on an economic trade level, the price the United States might pay for this is having less leverage and hence drawing less benefits from the relationship and running the risk that the major beneficiary of all of this is China.

So both on a security level and on an economic trade level, the price the United States might pay for this is having less leverage and hence drawing less benefits from the relationship and running the risk that the major beneficiary of all of this is China.

Yeah, that's a fair question to raise. And to some extent, I think what you're getting at is there is a contradiction in Trump's logic here. One of the arguments that the people around President Trump make is that by reestablishing good relations with Russia, even at the expense of Europe— the U.S. will be able to draw Russia away from China and leave China more isolated.

Yeah, that's a fair question to raise. And to some extent, I think what you're getting at is there is a contradiction in Trump's logic here. One of the arguments that the people around President Trump make is that by reestablishing good relations with Russia, even at the expense of Europe— the U.S. will be able to draw Russia away from China and leave China more isolated.

But a lot of foreign policy analysts say that's actually completely backwards. What this will do is not give Russia any less of an incentive to ally itself with China, but what it will do is give Europe a much greater incentive to build more and closer commercial ties to China.

But a lot of foreign policy analysts say that's actually completely backwards. What this will do is not give Russia any less of an incentive to ally itself with China, but what it will do is give Europe a much greater incentive to build more and closer commercial ties to China.

I think what we're seeing here is that Trump brings fundamentally a 19th century view of great power rivalry to foreign policy. The world is dominated by a small handful of great powers who are fundamentally predatory toward their smaller neighbors. And you see that a little bit with Trump's treatment of Canada and Mexico on trade and tariffs.

I think what we're seeing here is that Trump brings fundamentally a 19th century view of great power rivalry to foreign policy. The world is dominated by a small handful of great powers who are fundamentally predatory toward their smaller neighbors. And you see that a little bit with Trump's treatment of Canada and Mexico on trade and tariffs.

You see it also with his desire to annex Greenland, to perhaps annex the Panama Canal. But you also see it in his tolerance of other great powers behaving that way. So that explains his openness to Vladimir Putin absorbing parts of Ukraine and Crimea. It could also, down the road, explain his tolerance for China making moves in its neighborhood. And that's led to fears that China...

You see it also with his desire to annex Greenland, to perhaps annex the Panama Canal. But you also see it in his tolerance of other great powers behaving that way. So that explains his openness to Vladimir Putin absorbing parts of Ukraine and Crimea. It could also, down the road, explain his tolerance for China making moves in its neighborhood. And that's led to fears that China...

might make a move on Taiwan. So fundamentally, the way Trump seems to think about the world is as a small number of great powers carving up spheres of influence. And the smaller countries that lie within these spheres are simply going to be, in a sense, vassals. They're going to be treated as inferior countries, exploited and preyed upon by the great countries.

might make a move on Taiwan. So fundamentally, the way Trump seems to think about the world is as a small number of great powers carving up spheres of influence. And the smaller countries that lie within these spheres are simply going to be, in a sense, vassals. They're going to be treated as inferior countries, exploited and preyed upon by the great countries.

Candidly, no, because it is so fundamental to the way the U.S. has thought about its place in the world. The superpower status of the United States is not just a function of the size of the U.S. military or the size of the U.S. economy. It's a function of this incredible web of alliances that the U.S. has struck with like-minded countries literally spanning the globe.

Candidly, no, because it is so fundamental to the way the U.S. has thought about its place in the world. The superpower status of the United States is not just a function of the size of the U.S. military or the size of the U.S. economy. It's a function of this incredible web of alliances that the U.S. has struck with like-minded countries literally spanning the globe.