Mark Mazzetti

I think this is where you see one example of American-Israeli interests diverging in the war in Iran.

Same war.

Well, I mean, for one, you saw that increasingly President Trump and his advisers were growing frustrated that the war was not achieving the effects that they wanted it to achieve.

Iran was not buckling, right?

And many in Washington were kind of looking for an exit, a way out of the war, a way towards a ceasefire, where in Israel—

there was a determination among Prime Minister Netanyahu and his advisors to keep this going longer to make sure this would have a more conclusive end.

And on this issue of Lebanon and Hezbollah, I mean, effectively, President Trump, I don't think, cares what happens in Lebanon and with Hezbollah.

If a ceasefire in Lebanon is part of an ultimate end to the war in Iran, I think President Trump is perfectly happy with that.

But this is something that's far more difficult for Prime Minister Netanyahu to digest, as Ronan said.

And this divergence is on full display on Wednesday, the day after the ceasefire announcement.

When Israel launches a massive bombardment against Hezbollah.

Over 100 targets in minutes.

Scores dead.

And it sort of laid bare this idea that the U.S.

and Israel are not at all on the same page here.

And you saw the reaction from Iran.

Iranian leaders were furious about this and also recognized the leverage that they have.

If Washington really wants to end the war on Iran, the Iranians can also demand an end to the war in Lebanon.

And they can exploit this seam I just talked about in the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

So that's what they did.