Matt Grimm

Like last year alone, Lockheed Martin, the 2023 numbers, Lockheed Martin spent $6 billion on stock buybacks, They only spent $1.5 billion on IRAD, which is called internal R&D, their own at-risk funding of research and development. They spent four times the amount of money on stock buybacks than they did on at-risk research and development. That's wild. That's wild.

Like last year alone, Lockheed Martin, the 2023 numbers, Lockheed Martin spent $6 billion on stock buybacks, They only spent $1.5 billion on IRAD, which is called internal R&D, their own at-risk funding of research and development. They spent four times the amount of money on stock buybacks than they did on at-risk research and development. That's wild. That's wild.

Like last year alone, Lockheed Martin, the 2023 numbers, Lockheed Martin spent $6 billion on stock buybacks, They only spent $1.5 billion on IRAD, which is called internal R&D, their own at-risk funding of research and development. They spent four times the amount of money on stock buybacks than they did on at-risk research and development. That's wild. That's wild.

That's completely upside down from how any technology company, how any software company, how any Silicon Valley-type company operates. But I don't understand that. And the reason that they're doing that is... Because that's the incentive structure that exists within government procurement and is rewarding that kind of behavior.

That's completely upside down from how any technology company, how any software company, how any Silicon Valley-type company operates. But I don't understand that. And the reason that they're doing that is... Because that's the incentive structure that exists within government procurement and is rewarding that kind of behavior.

That's completely upside down from how any technology company, how any software company, how any Silicon Valley-type company operates. But I don't understand that. And the reason that they're doing that is... Because that's the incentive structure that exists within government procurement and is rewarding that kind of behavior.

So what I'm trying to propose in a new administration, kind of a new worldview, a new approach to these contracts is like stop funding that. It's not working. Like you're not getting the best technology in the hands of soldiers. But fundamentally what you are getting is you are getting technology that is two or three generations behind technology.

So what I'm trying to propose in a new administration, kind of a new worldview, a new approach to these contracts is like stop funding that. It's not working. Like you're not getting the best technology in the hands of soldiers. But fundamentally what you are getting is you are getting technology that is two or three generations behind technology.

So what I'm trying to propose in a new administration, kind of a new worldview, a new approach to these contracts is like stop funding that. It's not working. Like you're not getting the best technology in the hands of soldiers. But fundamentally what you are getting is you are getting technology that is two or three generations behind technology.

Because by the time you go from a requirements document to a PowerPoint proposal document, to hiring the engineers, to developing the thing on a cost plus basis, which takes exactly as long as you think it would, very long time, and then into a fielding and then ultimately into a support mechanism for that whole procurement, by definition, you're operating on requirements that are a decade, 15 years old.

Because by the time you go from a requirements document to a PowerPoint proposal document, to hiring the engineers, to developing the thing on a cost plus basis, which takes exactly as long as you think it would, very long time, and then into a fielding and then ultimately into a support mechanism for that whole procurement, by definition, you're operating on requirements that are a decade, 15 years old.

Because by the time you go from a requirements document to a PowerPoint proposal document, to hiring the engineers, to developing the thing on a cost plus basis, which takes exactly as long as you think it would, very long time, and then into a fielding and then ultimately into a support mechanism for that whole procurement, by definition, you're operating on requirements that are a decade, 15 years old.

There are two or three cycles behind where the current state of the art is.

There are two or three cycles behind where the current state of the art is.

There are two or three cycles behind where the current state of the art is.

Yeah, so it can be upwards of 15, 20 years to go from first requirements document to full fielding of a system, which is way longer than most Silicon Valley companies have been alive. A wild amount of time. I'm really enjoying your face right now.

Yeah, so it can be upwards of 15, 20 years to go from first requirements document to full fielding of a system, which is way longer than most Silicon Valley companies have been alive. A wild amount of time. I'm really enjoying your face right now.

Yeah, so it can be upwards of 15, 20 years to go from first requirements document to full fielding of a system, which is way longer than most Silicon Valley companies have been alive. A wild amount of time. I'm really enjoying your face right now.

No, I mean, if you remember in the early days of the Iraq War, we sent American soldiers and British soldiers into conflict in Iraq in soft-sided Humvees where they were just like bullets coming through the canvas on the side. We were equipped for a different kind of conflict.

No, I mean, if you remember in the early days of the Iraq War, we sent American soldiers and British soldiers into conflict in Iraq in soft-sided Humvees where they were just like bullets coming through the canvas on the side. We were equipped for a different kind of conflict.