Meredith Whittaker

And there's a deep discomfort that dates back to 1976, when Diffie-Hellman were trying to publish their paper, introducing public cryptography, and the US government was trying to suppress it, trying to say, don't publish this, right? And then, you know, but databases weren't quite big enough, networks weren't quite big enough or ubiquitous enough for it to matter matter.

And there's a deep discomfort that dates back to 1976, when Diffie-Hellman were trying to publish their paper, introducing public cryptography, and the US government was trying to suppress it, trying to say, don't publish this, right? And then, you know, but databases weren't quite big enough, networks weren't quite big enough or ubiquitous enough for it to matter matter.

And there's a deep discomfort that dates back to 1976, when Diffie-Hellman were trying to publish their paper, introducing public cryptography, and the US government was trying to suppress it, trying to say, don't publish this, right? And then, you know, but databases weren't quite big enough, networks weren't quite big enough or ubiquitous enough for it to matter matter.

But they were already looking at like, oh, shit, we don't want this in the public. Right. And then you go through the 90s and there's, you know, the Clipper chip and key escrow. And you have Stuart Baker writing in Wired magazine like PGP is just for terrorists. We have proof. It's, you know, no, no. He was PGP is for pedophiles. Right. Which really echoes what we're hearing now. Right.

But they were already looking at like, oh, shit, we don't want this in the public. Right. And then you go through the 90s and there's, you know, the Clipper chip and key escrow. And you have Stuart Baker writing in Wired magazine like PGP is just for terrorists. We have proof. It's, you know, no, no. He was PGP is for pedophiles. Right. Which really echoes what we're hearing now. Right.

But they were already looking at like, oh, shit, we don't want this in the public. Right. And then you go through the 90s and there's, you know, the Clipper chip and key escrow. And you have Stuart Baker writing in Wired magazine like PGP is just for terrorists. We have proof. It's, you know, no, no. He was PGP is for pedophiles. Right. Which really echoes what we're hearing now. Right.

Like who even has a computer in 1994? I believe when this op ed is written. And then we have post 9-11, and then it's like, actually, PGP is for terrorists, right? And encryption is for terrorists. All the while, our dependency on digital infrastructures for communications is growing and growing and growing. Our dependency on digital infrastructures generally is growing.

Like who even has a computer in 1994? I believe when this op ed is written. And then we have post 9-11, and then it's like, actually, PGP is for terrorists, right? And encryption is for terrorists. All the while, our dependency on digital infrastructures for communications is growing and growing and growing. Our dependency on digital infrastructures generally is growing.

Like who even has a computer in 1994? I believe when this op ed is written. And then we have post 9-11, and then it's like, actually, PGP is for terrorists, right? And encryption is for terrorists. All the while, our dependency on digital infrastructures for communications is growing and growing and growing. Our dependency on digital infrastructures generally is growing.

And the need for encryption to protect commerce becomes existential to the internet industry. And then what do you do about communications, right? And I think... I think this has been an anxiety that is pervasive among those who, you know, law enforcement, governments, whoever, who feel that they need to constitute their power via information asymmetry.

And the need for encryption to protect commerce becomes existential to the internet industry. And then what do you do about communications, right? And I think... I think this has been an anxiety that is pervasive among those who, you know, law enforcement, governments, whoever, who feel that they need to constitute their power via information asymmetry.

And the need for encryption to protect commerce becomes existential to the internet industry. And then what do you do about communications, right? And I think... I think this has been an anxiety that is pervasive among those who, you know, law enforcement, governments, whoever, who feel that they need to constitute their power via information asymmetry.

And any encryption that protects people, not just commerce, is a threat to that, right? And so what I don't see is that we're going to win an argument, right? Or that we're going to win this via strength of argument. I do think we can fight. And I think we're in a position now where we're seeing chat controls. I believe Hungary just tried to raise it and didn't get the support.

And any encryption that protects people, not just commerce, is a threat to that, right? And so what I don't see is that we're going to win an argument, right? Or that we're going to win this via strength of argument. I do think we can fight. And I think we're in a position now where we're seeing chat controls. I believe Hungary just tried to raise it and didn't get the support.

And any encryption that protects people, not just commerce, is a threat to that, right? And so what I don't see is that we're going to win an argument, right? Or that we're going to win this via strength of argument. I do think we can fight. And I think we're in a position now where we're seeing chat controls. I believe Hungary just tried to raise it and didn't get the support.

There was the Belgian proposal a few months ago, also didn't get the support at the last minute. And we just had the Dutch law enforcement authorities writing a memo to the government there saying, yo, don't support this. You're talking about a very dangerous backdoor that would undermine Dutch cybersecurity, right?

There was the Belgian proposal a few months ago, also didn't get the support at the last minute. And we just had the Dutch law enforcement authorities writing a memo to the government there saying, yo, don't support this. You're talking about a very dangerous backdoor that would undermine Dutch cybersecurity, right?

There was the Belgian proposal a few months ago, also didn't get the support at the last minute. And we just had the Dutch law enforcement authorities writing a memo to the government there saying, yo, don't support this. You're talking about a very dangerous backdoor that would undermine Dutch cybersecurity, right?

At the same time, we have reporting in the Wall Street Journal that provides a receipt for what all of us should have suspected all along is that

At the same time, we have reporting in the Wall Street Journal that provides a receipt for what all of us should have suspected all along is that