Mina Kimes

And also,

I do think that staring at this thing as clearly as possible, it's very, very hard to say, like, where are the macroeconomic receipts?

I don't know where they are yet.

I guess my question, before we get to the other side of this, which is what Derek and I originally went back and forth on, which is AI's actual utility for our jobs, but sticking with the actual bubble slash impact question,

When should we know by, man?

Because I am not someone who's here arguing the impact of this thing isn't going to grow or that it won't affect certain parts of the workforce.

My position has just been generally like, I have yet to see the evidence that the consumer-facing industry

or that side of the industry per se has demonstrated proven financial growth commensurate with how it's being discussed by some parties.

But my question for you is this.

I think you're correct in saying we're not seeing the actual economic impact at the moment.

If we are still talking about this in two years and people still aren't demonstrably paying for it,

this by their own volition, would you change your position?

Like, do you think that this is something that actually has to start to show its work per se in the next two or three years?

So the single biggest podcast that I did last year, the single biggest article that I wrote last year for my Substack was an interview with the investor Paul Kudrowski called, this is how the AI bubble bursts.

Like, so in a way, like,

My most profound contribution to this debate has been to outline exactly why I think it's plausible that AI turns out to be a bubble in two years.

That said, just because something's a bubble doesn't mean it isn't transformative.

The railroads, the transcontinental railroads in the 19th century were four different bubbles that crashed the economy.

It was also transformative.

The dot-com boom, the fiber optic cable build-out was an enormous bubble, the famous dot-com bubble.