Nick Bostrom

I don't think that we need to especially program that in.

I mean, for the same reasons we, if we are not in a simulation, would have this...

this notion of free will.

People in a simulation would presumably develop that for the same kind of reasons.

I mean it connects obviously to holding people accountable for certain things they do.

I mean if you stumble into somebody and bump them,

We say, well, you're excused because you didn't intend it, but if you go and punch them and achieve the same bruise, then you will be held accountable because that's something you did off your own free will.

And we make choices that we have to actually internally come up on a certain decision.

So all of those things would hold equally true for people in a simulation as people outside a simulation, right?

So if you have this for your free will, there wouldn't really be a difference, I think.

Sure, yeah.

I mean, depending on what you bake into the concept of a God, yeah, in many ways that would be analogous

to how some people have traditionally conceived of God, right?

In the sense that they would kind of have created our world, although they wouldn't have created a whole world, just the parts that we see.

They would presumably maybe not be omniscient, but they would know a lot and they would not be omnipotent.

They would themselves be subject to the physical constraints operating at their level of reality, but they could intervene in our reality, including in

And thereby produce miracles.

Yeah, but things that appear to us in the simulation as miracles.

So in one sense, there is a kind of structurally similar relationship.

On the other hand, they would be subject to all these, they would presumably be finite and subject to all these kind of limitations and constraints.