Nick Bostrom

And so then the idea is you do a similar Bayesian update and end up with a doomsday

And so then the idea is you do a similar Bayesian update and end up with a doomsday

argument conclusion, which is that doom-soon hypotheses are much more probable than you would naively think, just taking into account the normal empirical considerations.

argument conclusion, which is that doom-soon hypotheses are much more probable than you would naively think, just taking into account the normal empirical considerations.

And so you would have this systematic pessimistic update.

And so you would have this systematic pessimistic update.

That's roughly speaking how it goes.

That's roughly speaking how it goes.

And there's kind of more to it.

And there's kind of more to it.

In particular, to back up this

In particular, to back up this

premise that we use, like that you should, as it were, reason as if you were some randomly selected human from all the humans that ever have existed.

premise that we use, like that you should, as it were, reason as if you were some randomly selected human from all the humans that ever have existed.

Maybe you think, why think that?

Maybe you think, why think that?

But there are then some arguments that seem to suggest that something like that is necessary to make sense of how to reason about these types of indexicals.

But there are then some arguments that seem to suggest that something like that is necessary to make sense of how to reason about these types of indexicals.

Yeah, I think it will be.

Yeah, I think it will be.