Nicole Perlroth

Security camera footage outside Natan's centrifuge rooms showed frantic technicians in white lab coats and blue plastic shoe coverings carting out centrifuge after centrifuge. By public accounts, 2,000 of their 8,700 centrifuges were taken out. It was, in many ways, the digital Manhattan Project. Only in reverse. Because this, this was a counter-nuclear proliferation effort.

Security camera footage outside Natan's centrifuge rooms showed frantic technicians in white lab coats and blue plastic shoe coverings carting out centrifuge after centrifuge. By public accounts, 2,000 of their 8,700 centrifuges were taken out. It was, in many ways, the digital Manhattan Project. Only in reverse. Because this, this was a counter-nuclear proliferation effort.

And it was a masterpiece. Until the day it got out. How it got out, we still don't know exactly. But sometime in 2010, Stuxnet fled the coop, escaped Natanz, zoomed around the world, and infected hundreds of thousands of machines, including right here in the U.S. at companies like Chevron.

And it was a masterpiece. Until the day it got out. How it got out, we still don't know exactly. But sometime in 2010, Stuxnet fled the coop, escaped Natanz, zoomed around the world, and infected hundreds of thousands of machines, including right here in the U.S. at companies like Chevron.

Now, it didn't do these systems any harm. Our saving grace was that Stuxnet's code was clearly designed with lawyers standing over developers' shoulders. The worm had been carefully calibrated to exact destruction only on the centrifuges at Natanz, and nowhere else.

Now, it didn't do these systems any harm. Our saving grace was that Stuxnet's code was clearly designed with lawyers standing over developers' shoulders. The worm had been carefully calibrated to exact destruction only on the centrifuges at Natanz, and nowhere else.

But once it was discovered, dissected, reverse engineered, Stuxnet showed the world, perhaps no one more so than our adversaries, the endless opportunities to use code for mayhem and destruction. And it set new rules for the game. You could now jump into another nation's most critical infrastructure, their nuclear labs. And so long as you did it with code, you'd probably get away with it.

But once it was discovered, dissected, reverse engineered, Stuxnet showed the world, perhaps no one more so than our adversaries, the endless opportunities to use code for mayhem and destruction. And it set new rules for the game. You could now jump into another nation's most critical infrastructure, their nuclear labs. And so long as you did it with code, you'd probably get away with it.

Here's Ralph Langner speaking at TED in 2011. Ralph was among the first to dissect Stuxnet and to publicly point the finger at its makers, the U.S. and Israel. And he was the first to warn the world that this weapon we had just unleashed could come boomeranging back on us.

Here's Ralph Langner speaking at TED in 2011. Ralph was among the first to dissect Stuxnet and to publicly point the finger at its makers, the U.S. and Israel. And he was the first to warn the world that this weapon we had just unleashed could come boomeranging back on us.

As Ralph spoke those words, Iran was already preparing its retribution. One year later, Tehran's hackers came for Saudi Aramco, a key source of US oil. And though they tried, they never did make the jump from Aramco's IT network into its pipelines. Tehran's hackers were still light years behind those of the US and Israel, but they still managed to decimate 30,000 Aramco computers on their way out.

As Ralph spoke those words, Iran was already preparing its retribution. One year later, Tehran's hackers came for Saudi Aramco, a key source of US oil. And though they tried, they never did make the jump from Aramco's IT network into its pipelines. Tehran's hackers were still light years behind those of the US and Israel, but they still managed to decimate 30,000 Aramco computers on their way out.

And just in case their motive wasn't clear here, they made a point to replace all that data with one unmistakable image, a burning American flag.

And just in case their motive wasn't clear here, they made a point to replace all that data with one unmistakable image, a burning American flag.

But the Aramco attack still felt a world away when, one month later, Chinese hackers hit Telvent. This wasn't Tehran. This was Beijing. And initially, at least, there was no reason to think its hackers were doing anything beyond the usual IP theft.

But the Aramco attack still felt a world away when, one month later, Chinese hackers hit Telvent. This wasn't Tehran. This was Beijing. And initially, at least, there was no reason to think its hackers were doing anything beyond the usual IP theft.

Automation had been listed high up on the CCP's latest five-year plan, and that would have put Telvent's industrial automation software firmly in CCP crosshairs. But Dale suspected there was more to the story.

Automation had been listed high up on the CCP's latest five-year plan, and that would have put Telvent's industrial automation software firmly in CCP crosshairs. But Dale suspected there was more to the story.

That last bit bears repeating. If I can compromise this one system, I can compromise all these others. Telvent wasn't the end goal. It was the gateway. If someone wanted to map out America's pipeline network, shut us down, or, God forbid, trigger simultaneous explosions across America, Telvent was precisely the company to hack.

That last bit bears repeating. If I can compromise this one system, I can compromise all these others. Telvent wasn't the end goal. It was the gateway. If someone wanted to map out America's pipeline network, shut us down, or, God forbid, trigger simultaneous explosions across America, Telvent was precisely the company to hack.