Norman Finkelstein

On the Palestinian national home, he wouldn't go as far as a Palestinian state. I'm not going to go into the details of that. I don't think realistically, given the political balance of forces, that was going to happen, but that's a separate issue. Okay. Let's get to the issue at hand, namely what is the obstacle or what has been the obstacle since the early 1970s.

On the Palestinian national home, he wouldn't go as far as a Palestinian state. I'm not going to go into the details of that. I don't think realistically, given the political balance of forces, that was going to happen, but that's a separate issue. Okay. Let's get to the issue at hand, namely what is the obstacle or what has been the obstacle since the early 1970s.

On the Palestinian national home, he wouldn't go as far as a Palestinian state. I'm not going to go into the details of that. I don't think realistically, given the political balance of forces, that was going to happen, but that's a separate issue. Okay. Let's get to the issue at hand, namely what is the obstacle or what has been the obstacle since the early 1970s.

Since roughly 1974, the Palestinians have accepted the two-state settlement on the June 1967 border. Now,

Since roughly 1974, the Palestinians have accepted the two-state settlement on the June 1967 border. Now,

Since roughly 1974, the Palestinians have accepted the two-state settlement on the June 1967 border. Now,

As more pressure was exerted on Israel because the Palestinians seemed reasonable, the Israelis, to quote the Israeli political scientist Avner Yaniv, he since passed from the scene, Yaniv in his book Dilemmas of Security, he said that the big Israeli fear was what he called the Palestinian peace offensive. That was their worry, that the Palestinians were becoming too moderate.

As more pressure was exerted on Israel because the Palestinians seemed reasonable, the Israelis, to quote the Israeli political scientist Avner Yaniv, he since passed from the scene, Yaniv in his book Dilemmas of Security, he said that the big Israeli fear was what he called the Palestinian peace offensive. That was their worry, that the Palestinians were becoming too moderate.

As more pressure was exerted on Israel because the Palestinians seemed reasonable, the Israelis, to quote the Israeli political scientist Avner Yaniv, he since passed from the scene, Yaniv in his book Dilemmas of Security, he said that the big Israeli fear was what he called the Palestinian peace offensive. That was their worry, that the Palestinians were becoming too moderate.

And unless you understand that, you can't understand the June 1982 Lebanon War. The purpose of the June 1982 Lebanon War was to liquidate the PLO in southern Lebanon because they were too moderate, the Palestinian peace offensive. I'm going to have to fast forward. There are many events.

And unless you understand that, you can't understand the June 1982 Lebanon War. The purpose of the June 1982 Lebanon War was to liquidate the PLO in southern Lebanon because they were too moderate, the Palestinian peace offensive. I'm going to have to fast forward. There are many events.

And unless you understand that, you can't understand the June 1982 Lebanon War. The purpose of the June 1982 Lebanon War was to liquidate the PLO in southern Lebanon because they were too moderate, the Palestinian peace offensive. I'm going to have to fast forward. There are many events.

There's the First Intifada, then there's the Oslo Accord, and let's now go to the heart of the issue, namely the 2000-2001 negotiations. The negotiations are divided into three parts for the sake of listeners. There's Camp David in July 2000, there are the Clinton parameters in December 2000, and then there are negotiations in Taba in Egypt in 2001. Those are the three phases.

There's the First Intifada, then there's the Oslo Accord, and let's now go to the heart of the issue, namely the 2000-2001 negotiations. The negotiations are divided into three parts for the sake of listeners. There's Camp David in July 2000, there are the Clinton parameters in December 2000, and then there are negotiations in Taba in Egypt in 2001. Those are the three phases.

There's the First Intifada, then there's the Oslo Accord, and let's now go to the heart of the issue, namely the 2000-2001 negotiations. The negotiations are divided into three parts for the sake of listeners. There's Camp David in July 2000, there are the Clinton parameters in December 2000, and then there are negotiations in Taba in Egypt in 2001. Those are the three phases.

Now, I have studied the record probably to the point of insanity, because there are so many details you have to master. I'll vouch for that, the insanity part. Actually, I will vouch for it. I will personally vouch for it.

Now, I have studied the record probably to the point of insanity, because there are so many details you have to master. I'll vouch for that, the insanity part. Actually, I will vouch for it. I will personally vouch for it.

Now, I have studied the record probably to the point of insanity, because there are so many details you have to master. I'll vouch for that, the insanity part. Actually, I will vouch for it. I will personally vouch for it.

There is one extensive record from that whole period from 2000 to, you could say, 2007, and that is what came to be called the Palestine Papers, which are about 15,000 pages of all the records of the negotiations. I have read through all of them, every single page. And this is what I find. If you look at Shlomo Ben-Ami's book, which I have with me, Prophets Without Honor, it's his last book.

There is one extensive record from that whole period from 2000 to, you could say, 2007, and that is what came to be called the Palestine Papers, which are about 15,000 pages of all the records of the negotiations. I have read through all of them, every single page. And this is what I find. If you look at Shlomo Ben-Ami's book, which I have with me, Prophets Without Honor, it's his last book.