Orlando Bravo

It's really telling.

Well, it basically runs, maybe you cannot fly an airplane, right, without Jeppesen and its system.

And the way the deal started, we called the CEO of Boeing, actually sent him an email saying, hey, we could buy this division and we're paying these good prices.

So there was some interest, the process started, and there were about 15 private equity groups, all excellent groups involved in the deal.

It's a good business and I'm happy that they decided that.

It's our fund's business.

It's almost always the same.

We try to buy companies, and Jeppesen is a tweener in that because their margins were about 25%, but we feel that business can be running like a Denza that we sold to NASDAQ for 50% plus, running it like a software company and making the right investments.

The playbook is this.

You meet with a company, usually a public company, that trades for a revenue multiple because they're not that profitable.

And our mentality is we try to turn what we call a good innovator into a good business.

We have all these meetings with management, and after we listen a lot to them, we come back to them, and we put together a plan with them to cut costs.

So there is that element, because you have to get in the game with a certain level of fundamental earnings to be able to afford the deal.

You basically are, what we're trying to do is turn a revenue multiple day one, say we buy it for six or seven times to an EBITDA multiple in day four.

If that company grew 20% and you achieve a 50% margin, you've done that.

And then you say, what are the comps, what is this thing worth?

Is it a 20 PE, a 25 PE?

A 20 PE is about 15 times EBITDA.

You could double your asset value without the benefit of that at 30% leverage, which you pay down a bit.

And that's how you create your return.