Peter Singer

So consequentialists might value a wide range of things.

They might say, for example, that freedom or autonomy or knowledge or justice are independent goods, that they are things of intrinsic value.

even if they don't produce more happiness and less suffering for sentient beings.

Whereas utilitarians say, no, the only thing that is really of intrinsic value is the well-being of sentient beings, conscious, desirable conscious states, if you want to put it that way.

And

All of these other things are very important.

I needn't deny that they're important, but they're important instrumentally as a means to producing in the long run a society that does lead to more happiness for all sentient beings.

So that's the difference between non-utilitarian consequentialists, of whom there are some who think that there are these other independent goods, and utilitarians like myself.

Yes, I'm now a classic hedonist, hedonistic utilitarian.

That means I regard...

happiness and pleasure, again, desirable states of consciousness, we call them, the kinds of states of consciousness that you like to have for their own sake.

I regard them as good and undesirable states, obviously pain, misery, suffering as bad.

Again, for some years I was a preference utilitarian.

Right.

Yeah, yeah.

Okay.

So I was a preference utilitarian.

Again, somewhat under the influence of R.M.

Hare.

Because Hare's view was, as I said before, that moral judgments have to be universalizable.