Peter Zeihan

As a rule, the younger cohort, 25 and under, tends to be more politically radicalized, more classically, excuse me, not classically liberal, more pejoratively liberal, woke, whatever you want to call it, and much more in favor of things like redistributed economic policies because they don't have anything to lose.

They only have the possibility of gains.

It's age math.

And that has been true in every part of the world throughout the entire modern era.

Nothing's weird there.

Flip it.

When you turn 65, your income goes away.

You're now either on a fixed income or the assets you've accrued over your life.

That's all you have.

That's all you will ever have.

And so you get a little crotchety.

And so the environment we're in today, in most of the world, the young cohort is getting smaller and smaller and smaller and more brittle and more desperate, whereas the older cohort is getting larger and larger and larger and more ossified and more unwilling to make any compromises.

Throw that against a globalization.

We have the time where we're looking through some of the most radical economic transformations because of what's going on with globalization and deglobalization, at least in our lives, certainly since the 70s.

I'm sorry, certainly since the 40s, probably since the 1870s, and based on definition, maybe since the 1500s.

At the same time, we have our first ever, as a species, demographic inversion.

Of course it's going to be a shitshow.

The classic Democratic Party in the United States, there are three clusters to it.

You've got racial minorities, you've got organized labor, and you have the educated coastal elites.

The way that study defined it, it was just that third group.