Phillip Goff

add something, add another axiom to explain what happens to the superpositions, what happens to the many cats, right? What gets rid of the many cats? We have spontaneous collapse theories where something new happens to make all the many living and dead cats collapse into one. But the many worlds theorists say, we don't need to do that. All the cats are still there.

It's just because reality is branched We don't observe them. We're just one observer that's branched as well. So they have an explanation of why we don't see these superpositions that doesn't require somehow getting rid of the superpositions. I should qualify that slightly.

It's just because reality is branched We don't observe them. We're just one observer that's branched as well. So they have an explanation of why we don't see these superpositions that doesn't require somehow getting rid of the superpositions. I should qualify that slightly.

It's just because reality is branched We don't observe them. We're just one observer that's branched as well. So they have an explanation of why we don't see these superpositions that doesn't require somehow getting rid of the superpositions. I should qualify that slightly.

Not all interpretations get rid of the superpositions, but they at least add something to explain why we never observe them, whereas the many worlds people think we don't need to. But there's a big problem. How the hell do you make sense of probability if everything is going to happen? So, I mean, come back to Schrodinger's cat again.

Not all interpretations get rid of the superpositions, but they at least add something to explain why we never observe them, whereas the many worlds people think we don't need to. But there's a big problem. How the hell do you make sense of probability if everything is going to happen? So, I mean, come back to Schrodinger's cat again.

Not all interpretations get rid of the superpositions, but they at least add something to explain why we never observe them, whereas the many worlds people think we don't need to. But there's a big problem. How the hell do you make sense of probability if everything is going to happen? So, I mean, come back to Schrodinger's cat again.

We could set that up so that there's a 75% chance you'll get a living cat and a 25% chance you'll get a dead cat. But it looks like if you're a many worlds theorist, you should just say, well, there's 100% chance a version of me will see a living cat and 100% chance a version of me will see a dead cat. So whereas probability seems to evaporate.

We could set that up so that there's a 75% chance you'll get a living cat and a 25% chance you'll get a dead cat. But it looks like if you're a many worlds theorist, you should just say, well, there's 100% chance a version of me will see a living cat and 100% chance a version of me will see a dead cat. So whereas probability seems to evaporate.

We could set that up so that there's a 75% chance you'll get a living cat and a 25% chance you'll get a dead cat. But it looks like if you're a many worlds theorist, you should just say, well, there's 100% chance a version of me will see a living cat and 100% chance a version of me will see a dead cat. So whereas probability seems to evaporate.

And this is important because the evidential basis for quantum mechanics involves these claims about probability, the probability of what we're going to observe. So if many worlds can't make sense of probability, it looks like it undermines its own probability. base. That's the worry at least.

And this is important because the evidential basis for quantum mechanics involves these claims about probability, the probability of what we're going to observe. So if many worlds can't make sense of probability, it looks like it undermines its own probability. base. That's the worry at least.

And this is important because the evidential basis for quantum mechanics involves these claims about probability, the probability of what we're going to observe. So if many worlds can't make sense of probability, it looks like it undermines its own probability. base. That's the worry at least.

That's an interesting thought. Could you have a teleological solution to quantum mechanics? Maybe you should write a paper on this.

That's an interesting thought. Could you have a teleological solution to quantum mechanics? Maybe you should write a paper on this.

That's an interesting thought. Could you have a teleological solution to quantum mechanics? Maybe you should write a paper on this.

Well, I mean, I am persuaded that we do need to add something to make sense of probability. Quantum mechanics relies on claims about probability. If you just have many worlds where everything's happening, there's no probability. That's my view. People debate that, but it's a popular worry. So we do need to add something.

Well, I mean, I am persuaded that we do need to add something to make sense of probability. Quantum mechanics relies on claims about probability. If you just have many worlds where everything's happening, there's no probability. That's my view. People debate that, but it's a popular worry. So we do need to add something.

Well, I mean, I am persuaded that we do need to add something to make sense of probability. Quantum mechanics relies on claims about probability. If you just have many worlds where everything's happening, there's no probability. That's my view. People debate that, but it's a popular worry. So we do need to add something.

And here we finally get to this neglected interpretation that me and Kelvin are exploring. Maybe what we can add is consciousness, right? Maybe it's that that makes the difference. Now, there's a classic way of doing this. People might have heard of this idea that consciousness collapses the wave function. This was defended by Wigner in the 1960s, Nobel Prize winning quantum theorist.