Pierre Asselin

And that's how Nixon approaches it. The other element, I think, Don, that that accounts for the length of the disengagement is the model that Nixon is using. Nixon was always a big fan of Charles de Gaulle. And specifically, he admired the way de Gaulle had gotten France out of Algeria. Algeria was such a mess, right, for the French.

And Nixon, rightly or wrongly, believed that de Gaulle had indeed achieved what de Gaulle himself called la paix dans l'honneur, right, the peace in honor in Algeria. And just as it took de Gaulle four years to extricate France from Algeria, again, with a view to maintaining French credibility internationally after Algeria, Nixon would take four years to get the United States out of Vietnam.

And Nixon, rightly or wrongly, believed that de Gaulle had indeed achieved what de Gaulle himself called la paix dans l'honneur, right, the peace in honor in Algeria. And just as it took de Gaulle four years to extricate France from Algeria, again, with a view to maintaining French credibility internationally after Algeria, Nixon would take four years to get the United States out of Vietnam.

And Nixon, rightly or wrongly, believed that de Gaulle had indeed achieved what de Gaulle himself called la paix dans l'honneur, right, the peace in honor in Algeria. And just as it took de Gaulle four years to extricate France from Algeria, again, with a view to maintaining French credibility internationally after Algeria, Nixon would take four years to get the United States out of Vietnam.

And that's not coincidence. Nixon is very closely following the Gaullian playbook in Algeria when he's looking at Vietnam.

And that's not coincidence. Nixon is very closely following the Gaullian playbook in Algeria when he's looking at Vietnam.

And that's not coincidence. Nixon is very closely following the Gaullian playbook in Algeria when he's looking at Vietnam.

Yeah, yeah, yeah. And that's the thing, right? The French War in Algeria is so much in common with the American War in Vietnam. It's sensible because we always compare the American War in Vietnam to the French War in Vietnam. And that's wrong. We should be comparing it to the French War in Algeria.

Yeah, yeah, yeah. And that's the thing, right? The French War in Algeria is so much in common with the American War in Vietnam. It's sensible because we always compare the American War in Vietnam to the French War in Vietnam. And that's wrong. We should be comparing it to the French War in Algeria.

Yeah, yeah, yeah. And that's the thing, right? The French War in Algeria is so much in common with the American War in Vietnam. It's sensible because we always compare the American War in Vietnam to the French War in Vietnam. And that's wrong. We should be comparing it to the French War in Algeria.

There are many more parallels and similarities between those two conflicts than there are between the American War in Vietnam and the French War in Vietnam that preceded it.

There are many more parallels and similarities between those two conflicts than there are between the American War in Vietnam and the French War in Vietnam that preceded it.

There are many more parallels and similarities between those two conflicts than there are between the American War in Vietnam and the French War in Vietnam that preceded it.

I think the Americans were always more committed to a diplomatic solution than their counterparts in Hanoi. And when Johnson decides that he's going to try and solve this diplomatically, various efforts are made to connect with Hanoi.

I think the Americans were always more committed to a diplomatic solution than their counterparts in Hanoi. And when Johnson decides that he's going to try and solve this diplomatically, various efforts are made to connect with Hanoi.

I think the Americans were always more committed to a diplomatic solution than their counterparts in Hanoi. And when Johnson decides that he's going to try and solve this diplomatically, various efforts are made to connect with Hanoi.

Ultimately, all these initiatives are going to fail primarily because the leaders on the other side, the leaders in Hanoi, have no interest whatsoever in a negotiated solution. They're going to pretend to be interested because it's going to elevate their profile, their standing internationally, right? They're going to look reasonable, right?

Ultimately, all these initiatives are going to fail primarily because the leaders on the other side, the leaders in Hanoi, have no interest whatsoever in a negotiated solution. They're going to pretend to be interested because it's going to elevate their profile, their standing internationally, right? They're going to look reasonable, right?

Ultimately, all these initiatives are going to fail primarily because the leaders on the other side, the leaders in Hanoi, have no interest whatsoever in a negotiated solution. They're going to pretend to be interested because it's going to elevate their profile, their standing internationally, right? They're going to look reasonable, right?

But we now know from the record on the communist side that fundamentally this willingness to negotiate was not matched by an actual desire to find a compromise solution to the war. Until the latter stages of the war, leaders in Hanoi are going to remain convinced that they can win this militarily if they're patient enough and if they make the proper investment.