Pierre Asselin

But we now know from the record on the communist side that fundamentally this willingness to negotiate was not matched by an actual desire to find a compromise solution to the war. Until the latter stages of the war, leaders in Hanoi are going to remain convinced that they can win this militarily if they're patient enough and if they make the proper investment.

But we now know from the record on the communist side that fundamentally this willingness to negotiate was not matched by an actual desire to find a compromise solution to the war. Until the latter stages of the war, leaders in Hanoi are going to remain convinced that they can win this militarily if they're patient enough and if they make the proper investment.

So that would be the public narrative, right? So the communists are a really remarkable propaganda machine. And they were extremely good at controlling the narrative of the war, particularly the narrative that the international community consumed, if you will. And they certainly presented the American intervention as kind of this neo-colonial crusade, right?

So that would be the public narrative, right? So the communists are a really remarkable propaganda machine. And they were extremely good at controlling the narrative of the war, particularly the narrative that the international community consumed, if you will. And they certainly presented the American intervention as kind of this neo-colonial crusade, right?

So that would be the public narrative, right? So the communists are a really remarkable propaganda machine. And they were extremely good at controlling the narrative of the war, particularly the narrative that the international community consumed, if you will. And they certainly presented the American intervention as kind of this neo-colonial crusade, right?

But again, amongst themselves, privately, they recognize this as the United States essentially trying to contain their Marxist-Leninist ambitions. In the context of the Cold War, I really think the United States had no choice but to become involved in Vietnam.

But again, amongst themselves, privately, they recognize this as the United States essentially trying to contain their Marxist-Leninist ambitions. In the context of the Cold War, I really think the United States had no choice but to become involved in Vietnam.

But again, amongst themselves, privately, they recognize this as the United States essentially trying to contain their Marxist-Leninist ambitions. In the context of the Cold War, I really think the United States had no choice but to become involved in Vietnam.

And while the outcome and the circumstances that produced were certainly tragic, you know, it's hard to imagine the United States avoiding Vietnam in light of what's happening internationally. But what we see communist leaders do from the moment the Americans intervene is start tracing these parallels between what the Americans are doing and what the French did before them.

And while the outcome and the circumstances that produced were certainly tragic, you know, it's hard to imagine the United States avoiding Vietnam in light of what's happening internationally. But what we see communist leaders do from the moment the Americans intervene is start tracing these parallels between what the Americans are doing and what the French did before them.

And while the outcome and the circumstances that produced were certainly tragic, you know, it's hard to imagine the United States avoiding Vietnam in light of what's happening internationally. But what we see communist leaders do from the moment the Americans intervene is start tracing these parallels between what the Americans are doing and what the French did before them.

And of course, the international community loves this stuff, right? Because Vietnam has already been a victim of... of colonial exploitation and manipulation. So it becomes easy to cast the Americans in that same light. There's a commitment on the part of leaders in Hanoi to this Marxist-Leninist design.

And of course, the international community loves this stuff, right? Because Vietnam has already been a victim of... of colonial exploitation and manipulation. So it becomes easy to cast the Americans in that same light. There's a commitment on the part of leaders in Hanoi to this Marxist-Leninist design.

And of course, the international community loves this stuff, right? Because Vietnam has already been a victim of... of colonial exploitation and manipulation. So it becomes easy to cast the Americans in that same light. There's a commitment on the part of leaders in Hanoi to this Marxist-Leninist design.

We now know leaders in Hanoi were really shocked by Nixon's victory and they were deeply troubled by it. During the last year of his presidency, Johnson tries really, really hard to make peace happen. He curtails the bombing. He is very, very accommodating. And as it turns out, Hanoi will interpret all of this as weakness on the part of the Americans.

We now know leaders in Hanoi were really shocked by Nixon's victory and they were deeply troubled by it. During the last year of his presidency, Johnson tries really, really hard to make peace happen. He curtails the bombing. He is very, very accommodating. And as it turns out, Hanoi will interpret all of this as weakness on the part of the Americans.

We now know leaders in Hanoi were really shocked by Nixon's victory and they were deeply troubled by it. During the last year of his presidency, Johnson tries really, really hard to make peace happen. He curtails the bombing. He is very, very accommodating. And as it turns out, Hanoi will interpret all of this as weakness on the part of the Americans.

And so instead of encouraging Hanoi to negotiate, Johnson's overture are going to essentially kind of make Hanoi solidify its position, right? So it's all perception, right? But we now know that in Hanoi, Johnson's, I guess, flexibility was interpreted as weakness. Nixon comes to power, and leaders in Hanoi are very much aware of his background, and they are concerned.

And so instead of encouraging Hanoi to negotiate, Johnson's overture are going to essentially kind of make Hanoi solidify its position, right? So it's all perception, right? But we now know that in Hanoi, Johnson's, I guess, flexibility was interpreted as weakness. Nixon comes to power, and leaders in Hanoi are very much aware of his background, and they are concerned.

And so instead of encouraging Hanoi to negotiate, Johnson's overture are going to essentially kind of make Hanoi solidify its position, right? So it's all perception, right? But we now know that in Hanoi, Johnson's, I guess, flexibility was interpreted as weakness. Nixon comes to power, and leaders in Hanoi are very much aware of his background, and they are concerned.