Pierre Asselin

Then Nixon decides to Vietnamize the war, which is really de-Americanize the Vietnamese civil war. And they like that. But then he starts talking to the Chinese. He starts talking to the Soviets. He invades Cambodia. He invades Laos. And then the communist leadership is really, really concerned about Nixon.

Then Nixon decides to Vietnamize the war, which is really de-Americanize the Vietnamese civil war. And they like that. But then he starts talking to the Chinese. He starts talking to the Soviets. He invades Cambodia. He invades Laos. And then the communist leadership is really, really concerned about Nixon.

Then Nixon decides to Vietnamize the war, which is really de-Americanize the Vietnamese civil war. And they like that. But then he starts talking to the Chinese. He starts talking to the Soviets. He invades Cambodia. He invades Laos. And then the communist leadership is really, really concerned about Nixon.

And that's going to make them a little more humble in the way that they approach diplomacy with the Americans.

And that's going to make them a little more humble in the way that they approach diplomacy with the Americans.

And that's going to make them a little more humble in the way that they approach diplomacy with the Americans.

No. So, you know, people always talk about the Tet Offensive as America's biggest intelligence failure in Vietnam. How could we not see this coming? To me, the biggest intelligence failure of the whole war is the inability of American leaders to ever understand who they were up against. You know, all along, they assume Ho Chi Minh is in charge, right?

No. So, you know, people always talk about the Tet Offensive as America's biggest intelligence failure in Vietnam. How could we not see this coming? To me, the biggest intelligence failure of the whole war is the inability of American leaders to ever understand who they were up against. You know, all along, they assume Ho Chi Minh is in charge, right?

No. So, you know, people always talk about the Tet Offensive as America's biggest intelligence failure in Vietnam. How could we not see this coming? To me, the biggest intelligence failure of the whole war is the inability of American leaders to ever understand who they were up against. You know, all along, they assume Ho Chi Minh is in charge, right?

And then Ho Chi Minh dies in 69, and they're still not clear on who's running the show in Hanoi. We now know that long before American ground troops are committed to South Vietnam, we have a leadership of really, really hard men in power, that has effectively sidelined Ho Chi Minh and the famous General Giap. A guy by the name of Le Duan or Le Zuan is basically calling the shots in Hanoi.

And then Ho Chi Minh dies in 69, and they're still not clear on who's running the show in Hanoi. We now know that long before American ground troops are committed to South Vietnam, we have a leadership of really, really hard men in power, that has effectively sidelined Ho Chi Minh and the famous General Giap. A guy by the name of Le Duan or Le Zuan is basically calling the shots in Hanoi.

And then Ho Chi Minh dies in 69, and they're still not clear on who's running the show in Hanoi. We now know that long before American ground troops are committed to South Vietnam, we have a leadership of really, really hard men in power, that has effectively sidelined Ho Chi Minh and the famous General Giap. A guy by the name of Le Duan or Le Zuan is basically calling the shots in Hanoi.

And those guys are uncompromising. And Americans never knew until long after the war was over who exactly were those guys and the extent that they never understood also the extent of their commitment to what communists called total victory.

And those guys are uncompromising. And Americans never knew until long after the war was over who exactly were those guys and the extent that they never understood also the extent of their commitment to what communists called total victory.

And those guys are uncompromising. And Americans never knew until long after the war was over who exactly were those guys and the extent that they never understood also the extent of their commitment to what communists called total victory.

Before entering into negotiations, what Nixon essentially tried to do was enhance his bargaining position, which I know I respected because the communists in Vietnam, especially after the whole Geneva fiasco of 1954, always told themselves that moving forward, they would only negotiate from what they call a position of strength.

Before entering into negotiations, what Nixon essentially tried to do was enhance his bargaining position, which I know I respected because the communists in Vietnam, especially after the whole Geneva fiasco of 1954, always told themselves that moving forward, they would only negotiate from what they call a position of strength.

Before entering into negotiations, what Nixon essentially tried to do was enhance his bargaining position, which I know I respected because the communists in Vietnam, especially after the whole Geneva fiasco of 1954, always told themselves that moving forward, they would only negotiate from what they call a position of strength.

You enhance your position on the field of battle, and then you negotiate. And that's exactly what Nixon ends up doing. He's following his own plan, but Nixon understands that it's really pointless to engage with Hanoi unless I have leverage over them. And that's why, you know, Nixon is going to open a secret channel to Hanoi, a so-called back channel, in the summer of 1969.

You enhance your position on the field of battle, and then you negotiate. And that's exactly what Nixon ends up doing. He's following his own plan, but Nixon understands that it's really pointless to engage with Hanoi unless I have leverage over them. And that's why, you know, Nixon is going to open a secret channel to Hanoi, a so-called back channel, in the summer of 1969.