Pierre Asselin

You enhance your position on the field of battle, and then you negotiate. And that's exactly what Nixon ends up doing. He's following his own plan, but Nixon understands that it's really pointless to engage with Hanoi unless I have leverage over them. And that's why, you know, Nixon is going to open a secret channel to Hanoi, a so-called back channel, in the summer of 1969.

But, you know, he's kind of like the Vietnamese, right? He's using this to probe the other guys. But then in the meantime, what he does is he undertakes a series of initiatives that are meant to increase the pressure on Hanoi to negotiate on the one hand and then enhance the American bargaining position on the other. And that's very, very clever foreign policymaking, if you ask me.

But, you know, he's kind of like the Vietnamese, right? He's using this to probe the other guys. But then in the meantime, what he does is he undertakes a series of initiatives that are meant to increase the pressure on Hanoi to negotiate on the one hand and then enhance the American bargaining position on the other. And that's very, very clever foreign policymaking, if you ask me.

But, you know, he's kind of like the Vietnamese, right? He's using this to probe the other guys. But then in the meantime, what he does is he undertakes a series of initiatives that are meant to increase the pressure on Hanoi to negotiate on the one hand and then enhance the American bargaining position on the other. And that's very, very clever foreign policymaking, if you ask me.

The idea is you subsume the so-called military struggle under your diplomatic struggle, right? So all along you want to negotiate, but you understand that you can be better positioned to negotiate if your battlefield situation is favorable. And so as part of that strategy, we see Nixon sponsoring this invasion of Cambodia and a year later that of Laos, right? And that's meant to kind of

The idea is you subsume the so-called military struggle under your diplomatic struggle, right? So all along you want to negotiate, but you understand that you can be better positioned to negotiate if your battlefield situation is favorable. And so as part of that strategy, we see Nixon sponsoring this invasion of Cambodia and a year later that of Laos, right? And that's meant to kind of

The idea is you subsume the so-called military struggle under your diplomatic struggle, right? So all along you want to negotiate, but you understand that you can be better positioned to negotiate if your battlefield situation is favorable. And so as part of that strategy, we see Nixon sponsoring this invasion of Cambodia and a year later that of Laos, right? And that's meant to kind of

cut off communist supply lines into the South. And then, as I mentioned earlier, you have the Americans engaging leaders in Beijing, leaders in Moscow, further increasing the pressure on Hanoi. And then in 71, 72, the Americans make their big diplomatic push for an agreement.

cut off communist supply lines into the South. And then, as I mentioned earlier, you have the Americans engaging leaders in Beijing, leaders in Moscow, further increasing the pressure on Hanoi. And then in 71, 72, the Americans make their big diplomatic push for an agreement.

cut off communist supply lines into the South. And then, as I mentioned earlier, you have the Americans engaging leaders in Beijing, leaders in Moscow, further increasing the pressure on Hanoi. And then in 71, 72, the Americans make their big diplomatic push for an agreement.

And at that point, Hanoi will be much more accommodating than it would have been in 69, let's say, during Nixon's first year in office, and much more accommodating than it ever was during the Johnson years.

And at that point, Hanoi will be much more accommodating than it would have been in 69, let's say, during Nixon's first year in office, and much more accommodating than it ever was during the Johnson years.

And at that point, Hanoi will be much more accommodating than it would have been in 69, let's say, during Nixon's first year in office, and much more accommodating than it ever was during the Johnson years.

Well, so you know, it's funny, right? When it comes to negotiating peace, there are certain cities we associate with peace because of their history, right? It's no coincidence that all this stuff happens in Geneva, right? to the point where people get confused between the Geneva Accords, the Geneva Conventions, and Paris is another one of those places, right?

Well, so you know, it's funny, right? When it comes to negotiating peace, there are certain cities we associate with peace because of their history, right? It's no coincidence that all this stuff happens in Geneva, right? to the point where people get confused between the Geneva Accords, the Geneva Conventions, and Paris is another one of those places, right?

Well, so you know, it's funny, right? When it comes to negotiating peace, there are certain cities we associate with peace because of their history, right? It's no coincidence that all this stuff happens in Geneva, right? to the point where people get confused between the Geneva Accords, the Geneva Conventions, and Paris is another one of those places, right?

I mean, Paris is where the Americans negotiated their independence, right? Paris is the site of countless other major negotiations. So having Paris as a site for negotiations is symbolic, and it attests to the seriousness with which both sides are going to approach the talks. Beyond that, in this particular case, you also have the fact that common acquaintances

I mean, Paris is where the Americans negotiated their independence, right? Paris is the site of countless other major negotiations. So having Paris as a site for negotiations is symbolic, and it attests to the seriousness with which both sides are going to approach the talks. Beyond that, in this particular case, you also have the fact that common acquaintances

I mean, Paris is where the Americans negotiated their independence, right? Paris is the site of countless other major negotiations. So having Paris as a site for negotiations is symbolic, and it attests to the seriousness with which both sides are going to approach the talks. Beyond that, in this particular case, you also have the fact that common acquaintances

of the Americans and the North Vietnamese are French and therefore can facilitate these meetings, both the public and semi-public ones, which are going to take place in a hotel, and then the secret ones, which are going to take place at the private homes of people that Kissinger and leaders in Hanoi know. And that back channel that Nixon opens in 69 is going to function