Pierre Asselin

of the Americans and the North Vietnamese are French and therefore can facilitate these meetings, both the public and semi-public ones, which are going to take place in a hotel, and then the secret ones, which are going to take place at the private homes of people that Kissinger and leaders in Hanoi know. And that back channel that Nixon opens in 69 is going to function

of the Americans and the North Vietnamese are French and therefore can facilitate these meetings, both the public and semi-public ones, which are going to take place in a hotel, and then the secret ones, which are going to take place at the private homes of people that Kissinger and leaders in Hanoi know. And that back channel that Nixon opens in 69 is going to function

No one's going to be aware of the existence of these stocks, except Nixon, Kissinger, and a couple of their advisors, and then the guys on the other side in Hanoi. And as part of the effort to keep everything secret, they met at the private residences of people they both knew in Paris or outside Paris.

No one's going to be aware of the existence of these stocks, except Nixon, Kissinger, and a couple of their advisors, and then the guys on the other side in Hanoi. And as part of the effort to keep everything secret, they met at the private residences of people they both knew in Paris or outside Paris.

No one's going to be aware of the existence of these stocks, except Nixon, Kissinger, and a couple of their advisors, and then the guys on the other side in Hanoi. And as part of the effort to keep everything secret, they met at the private residences of people they both knew in Paris or outside Paris.

I mean, it takes four years. The real productive phase of the talks unfolds in the second half of 72 and early 1973. Prior to that, they're talking about But they're not really negotiating, you know, it's it's and they spend, you know, particularly under Johnson, they spend a lot of time talking about talks. Right. Like what what shape should the table be? Right.

I mean, it takes four years. The real productive phase of the talks unfolds in the second half of 72 and early 1973. Prior to that, they're talking about But they're not really negotiating, you know, it's it's and they spend, you know, particularly under Johnson, they spend a lot of time talking about talks. Right. Like what what shape should the table be? Right.

I mean, it takes four years. The real productive phase of the talks unfolds in the second half of 72 and early 1973. Prior to that, they're talking about But they're not really negotiating, you know, it's it's and they spend, you know, particularly under Johnson, they spend a lot of time talking about talks. Right. Like what what shape should the table be? Right.

How many people should be present and should the press be there and so on and so forth?

How many people should be present and should the press be there and so on and so forth?

How many people should be present and should the press be there and so on and so forth?

Because that, and again, right, we might think, oh, this is stupid, but that's the thing, right? If it's like a square table, it basically means that all four sides are equal, right? But that was the problem with Vietnam, right? Hanoi did not recognize the government in the South. The government in the South did not recognize Hanoi, right?

Because that, and again, right, we might think, oh, this is stupid, but that's the thing, right? If it's like a square table, it basically means that all four sides are equal, right? But that was the problem with Vietnam, right? Hanoi did not recognize the government in the South. The government in the South did not recognize Hanoi, right?

Because that, and again, right, we might think, oh, this is stupid, but that's the thing, right? If it's like a square table, it basically means that all four sides are equal, right? But that was the problem with Vietnam, right? Hanoi did not recognize the government in the South. The government in the South did not recognize Hanoi, right?

So these little things that many people are quick to dismiss as stupid or inconsequential actually mean an awful lot in the context of a serious negotiation.

So these little things that many people are quick to dismiss as stupid or inconsequential actually mean an awful lot in the context of a serious negotiation.

So these little things that many people are quick to dismiss as stupid or inconsequential actually mean an awful lot in the context of a serious negotiation.

So this is where it gets really, really interesting, Don. After Nixon assumes the presidency... We technically have two ongoing negotiations with respect to Vietnam. We have these kind of semi-public talks that were initiated by Johnson. And then we have these secret talks that were initiated by Nixon. Now, the secret channel becomes the primary channel for negotiating.

So this is where it gets really, really interesting, Don. After Nixon assumes the presidency... We technically have two ongoing negotiations with respect to Vietnam. We have these kind of semi-public talks that were initiated by Johnson. And then we have these secret talks that were initiated by Nixon. Now, the secret channel becomes the primary channel for negotiating.

So this is where it gets really, really interesting, Don. After Nixon assumes the presidency... We technically have two ongoing negotiations with respect to Vietnam. We have these kind of semi-public talks that were initiated by Johnson. And then we have these secret talks that were initiated by Nixon. Now, the secret channel becomes the primary channel for negotiating.