Rory Sutherland

they didn't like the idea of Amazon Web Services. Now, Jeff has an interesting notion, which is what he calls a two-way door. If you talk to people, by the way, at Amazon, it's a very, very interesting... I'm not sure I could cope with it, to be absolutely honest. But it is a very, very interesting culture in terms of its approach to everything from meetings to decision-making.

they didn't like the idea of Amazon Web Services. Now, Jeff has an interesting notion, which is what he calls a two-way door. If you talk to people, by the way, at Amazon, it's a very, very interesting... I'm not sure I could cope with it, to be absolutely honest. But it is a very, very interesting culture in terms of its approach to everything from meetings to decision-making.

What a two-way door is, is something where you can walk through the door, and if you don't like what you see, you can walk back. So a one-way door would be deciding to build a sort of 2 million square foot distribution center north of Memphis, okay? Once you've built that, it's difficult, not impossible, but it's difficult to reverse the decision. Right.

What a two-way door is, is something where you can walk through the door, and if you don't like what you see, you can walk back. So a one-way door would be deciding to build a sort of 2 million square foot distribution center north of Memphis, okay? Once you've built that, it's difficult, not impossible, but it's difficult to reverse the decision. Right.

What a two-way door is, is something where you can walk through the door, and if you don't like what you see, you can walk back. So a one-way door would be deciding to build a sort of 2 million square foot distribution center north of Memphis, okay? Once you've built that, it's difficult, not impossible, but it's difficult to reverse the decision. Right.

There, you actually depend on a large degree of decision-making rigor and rationality, you know, and you need a really rigorous case. But in other cases, Jeff would say, it's a two-way door. Try it. If it works, whoop-de-doo, that's great. If it doesn't work, we simply stop doing it.

There, you actually depend on a large degree of decision-making rigor and rationality, you know, and you need a really rigorous case. But in other cases, Jeff would say, it's a two-way door. Try it. If it works, whoop-de-doo, that's great. If it doesn't work, we simply stop doing it.

There, you actually depend on a large degree of decision-making rigor and rationality, you know, and you need a really rigorous case. But in other cases, Jeff would say, it's a two-way door. Try it. If it works, whoop-de-doo, that's great. If it doesn't work, we simply stop doing it.

And to be honest, the trial possibly costs less than we would have spent just arguing about it if we were adopting a kind of purist approach. And I think it is important because Why I think this is becoming vitally important is most business is probabilistic, but everybody in business wants to prove and pretend that it's deterministic.

And to be honest, the trial possibly costs less than we would have spent just arguing about it if we were adopting a kind of purist approach. And I think it is important because Why I think this is becoming vitally important is most business is probabilistic, but everybody in business wants to prove and pretend that it's deterministic.

And to be honest, the trial possibly costs less than we would have spent just arguing about it if we were adopting a kind of purist approach. And I think it is important because Why I think this is becoming vitally important is most business is probabilistic, but everybody in business wants to prove and pretend that it's deterministic.

So every spreadsheet is in some ways an act of pretense because it's past information, which you pretend has wonderful predictive value as if it's kind of Laplace's demon, but it really doesn't. Okay, because weird shit happens out of nowhere all the time. And you have this fundamental problem, I think, where I think what distinguishes someone like Jeff is their probabilistic thinkers.

So every spreadsheet is in some ways an act of pretense because it's past information, which you pretend has wonderful predictive value as if it's kind of Laplace's demon, but it really doesn't. Okay, because weird shit happens out of nowhere all the time. And you have this fundamental problem, I think, where I think what distinguishes someone like Jeff is their probabilistic thinkers.

So every spreadsheet is in some ways an act of pretense because it's past information, which you pretend has wonderful predictive value as if it's kind of Laplace's demon, but it really doesn't. Okay, because weird shit happens out of nowhere all the time. And you have this fundamental problem, I think, where I think what distinguishes someone like Jeff is their probabilistic thinkers.

They just go, well, look, it probably won't work, but if it does, it will be spectacular. And they are in a position where they can take those decisions. In their defense, most people, I think, first of all, most people are promoted within business for their aptitude in solving reductionist deterministic problems. How do you optimize this

They just go, well, look, it probably won't work, but if it does, it will be spectacular. And they are in a position where they can take those decisions. In their defense, most people, I think, first of all, most people are promoted within business for their aptitude in solving reductionist deterministic problems. How do you optimize this

They just go, well, look, it probably won't work, but if it does, it will be spectacular. And they are in a position where they can take those decisions. In their defense, most people, I think, first of all, most people are promoted within business for their aptitude in solving reductionist deterministic problems. How do you optimize this

Yeah, absolutely right. Yeah. And actually, by the way, they probably, in most cases in business, you capture remarkably few of the gains from a bold decision, whereas you capture 100% of the blame if it goes wrong. Correct. Yeah. So certain decisions, decisions which are what you might call low chance of success, huge return.

Yeah, absolutely right. Yeah. And actually, by the way, they probably, in most cases in business, you capture remarkably few of the gains from a bold decision, whereas you capture 100% of the blame if it goes wrong. Correct. Yeah. So certain decisions, decisions which are what you might call low chance of success, huge return.

Yeah, absolutely right. Yeah. And actually, by the way, they probably, in most cases in business, you capture remarkably few of the gains from a bold decision, whereas you capture 100% of the blame if it goes wrong. Correct. Yeah. So certain decisions, decisions which are what you might call low chance of success, huge return.