Rush Doshi

Well, China is responsible for seven times more installations of industrial machine robotic technology than the United States. And half of all the world's robot installations occurred in China in 2023. So they're betting on the ability to convert that into even greater manufacturing capability. And again, that is just one of the many metrics of scale.

Well, China is responsible for seven times more installations of industrial machine robotic technology than the United States. And half of all the world's robot installations occurred in China in 2023. So they're betting on the ability to convert that into even greater manufacturing capability. And again, that is just one of the many metrics of scale.

China is number one in top-sided academic publications in science. It's also number one in active patents. You can quibble with those statistics. You should. They have problems. But quantity is a quality of its own. And we think that matters for global politics.

China is number one in top-sided academic publications in science. It's also number one in active patents. You can quibble with those statistics. You should. They have problems. But quantity is a quality of its own. And we think that matters for global politics.

On the demographic side, there's two dimensions here. One is the sheer size of China, four times the US population, which means there's a large base of talent that they can draw from domestically if they can educate their population properly.

On the demographic side, there's two dimensions here. One is the sheer size of China, four times the US population, which means there's a large base of talent that they can draw from domestically if they can educate their population properly.

And we do see that in sheer numbers, China produces a significant cohort of top flight scientific talent, including in some of the arcane fields we might only have a few dozen experts in. So there's a demographic advantage that comes from that. But there's also a disadvantage that China has, right? It's a fast-aging society.

And we do see that in sheer numbers, China produces a significant cohort of top flight scientific talent, including in some of the arcane fields we might only have a few dozen experts in. So there's a demographic advantage that comes from that. But there's also a disadvantage that China has, right? It's a fast-aging society.

In the next 75 years, China's population will drop by half from the number it's in today. That's a significant drop. The question, though, isn't, is China graying? The question is, what timeframe matters for American geopolitical advantage or for Chinese geopolitical advantage?

In the next 75 years, China's population will drop by half from the number it's in today. That's a significant drop. The question, though, isn't, is China graying? The question is, what timeframe matters for American geopolitical advantage or for Chinese geopolitical advantage?

The basic point is that China has a grand strategy that's evolved over time to displace the U.S. from its order, first at the regional level within the Indo-Pacific and then at the global level. And really, if you look at how China's approach has shifted across time,

The basic point is that China has a grand strategy that's evolved over time to displace the U.S. from its order, first at the regional level within the Indo-Pacific and then at the global level. And really, if you look at how China's approach has shifted across time,

The biggest variable that has always affected China's strategy is its perception of the relative power gap between the US and China. Back in the Cold War, the US and China were almost quasi-allies against the Soviet Union. It all changed because of a traumatic trifecta of events from Beijing's perspective. The Gulf War showed American military dominance.

The biggest variable that has always affected China's strategy is its perception of the relative power gap between the US and China. Back in the Cold War, the US and China were almost quasi-allies against the Soviet Union. It all changed because of a traumatic trifecta of events from Beijing's perspective. The Gulf War showed American military dominance.

The end of the Cold War took away the glue that held the U.S. and China together. And then, of course, there was the reality of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, which revealed to China an ideological threat from the U.S. And after that, the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee sort of determined that the U.S. was the chief adversary of China.

The end of the Cold War took away the glue that held the U.S. and China together. And then, of course, there was the reality of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, which revealed to China an ideological threat from the U.S. And after that, the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee sort of determined that the U.S. was the chief adversary of China.

And that led them to start a strategy that they called hiding capabilities and biding time to quietly blunt America's power while continuing to benefit from the economic trade with the United States that built China into superpower today. And all that continues until 2008, when the global financial crisis scrambles China's perception again of America.

And that led them to start a strategy that they called hiding capabilities and biding time to quietly blunt America's power while continuing to benefit from the economic trade with the United States that built China into superpower today. And all that continues until 2008, when the global financial crisis scrambles China's perception again of America.

And this time they saw the United States as weakening, still threatening, but weakening. And that led them to a new strategy, not hide capabilities and buy time, not blunting American power, but actively accomplishing something, building Chinese power, specifically Chinese order within Asia.

And this time they saw the United States as weakening, still threatening, but weakening. And that led them to a new strategy, not hide capabilities and buy time, not blunting American power, but actively accomplishing something, building Chinese power, specifically Chinese order within Asia.