Rush Doshi

They invest in power projection capabilities within the region so they can tell their neighbors more what to do. They build economic institutions within the region so they can demonstrate leadership. They also build political institutions, et cetera. Beginning in 2016, 2017, China's perception of the US changed one more time.

They invest in power projection capabilities within the region so they can tell their neighbors more what to do. They build economic institutions within the region so they can demonstrate leadership. They also build political institutions, et cetera. Beginning in 2016, 2017, China's perception of the US changed one more time.

There was a perception that the US and the West were sort of riddled with populism that was eroding the capability of government to function. And they have a new phrase, the Chinese in this period under Xi Jinping, which is great changes unseen in a century. The world is undergoing great changes unseen in a century.

There was a perception that the US and the West were sort of riddled with populism that was eroding the capability of government to function. And they have a new phrase, the Chinese in this period under Xi Jinping, which is great changes unseen in a century. The world is undergoing great changes unseen in a century.

And that's what brings us to a global period of Chinese grand strategy focused on global military bases, making the world more dependent on China's supply chains than China is on the world's.

And that's what brings us to a global period of Chinese grand strategy focused on global military bases, making the world more dependent on China's supply chains than China is on the world's.

leading in technology, what they call the fourth industrial revolution, not just for prosperity, but for power and resetting the foundational baseline assumptions of the international system to be more conducive to China's authoritarian system of government than the democratic one that we have.

leading in technology, what they call the fourth industrial revolution, not just for prosperity, but for power and resetting the foundational baseline assumptions of the international system to be more conducive to China's authoritarian system of government than the democratic one that we have.

We're right now a few months into a new US administration, the Trump administration, which is pursuing a different approach on a variety of fronts, including with allies. What China is doing right now is it's seeing a degree of opportunity in pulling away some of the countries that might be wary of the US approach or disaffected. And it's trying to drive a wedge between the US and those countries.

We're right now a few months into a new US administration, the Trump administration, which is pursuing a different approach on a variety of fronts, including with allies. What China is doing right now is it's seeing a degree of opportunity in pulling away some of the countries that might be wary of the US approach or disaffected. And it's trying to drive a wedge between the US and those countries.

That's not new. China has sought to do this, and Kurt knows it better than I have, having been involved in just about every major effort in the post-Cold War era on Asia. China has been trying this game for a long time. It's not clear they're going to succeed now either, but that's a critical focus of their foreign policy.

That's not new. China has sought to do this, and Kurt knows it better than I have, having been involved in just about every major effort in the post-Cold War era on Asia. China has been trying this game for a long time. It's not clear they're going to succeed now either, but that's a critical focus of their foreign policy.

Separately from that, they're also aligning with countries that share their perspective or their sense of agreement relative to the U.S. order. And we know those countries. It's Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Separately from that, they're also aligning with countries that share their perspective or their sense of agreement relative to the U.S. order. And we know those countries. It's Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

What Kurt and I have offered is a sense that our alliances can't simply be what they've been for a long time. We can't look at alliances in the purely hierarchical sense that we had. We can't fall into past habits. We can't see them in purely military terms either.

What Kurt and I have offered is a sense that our alliances can't simply be what they've been for a long time. We can't look at alliances in the purely hierarchical sense that we had. We can't fall into past habits. We can't see them in purely military terms either.

We have to see them now at a time where China has scale across just about every dimension as ways of pooling capacity or as being the foundation for a capacity-centric statecraft. There's a bit of humility in this for the United States as well.

We have to see them now at a time where China has scale across just about every dimension as ways of pooling capacity or as being the foundation for a capacity-centric statecraft. There's a bit of humility in this for the United States as well.

What we're doing is we're saying there are areas where the US has lost a capability that its allies have gained or maintained, and those allies can bring it back to the US and we can work on that together. What we offer is several practical solutions. On the security side, we talk about Japan and Korea being able to help build American ships.

What we're doing is we're saying there are areas where the US has lost a capability that its allies have gained or maintained, and those allies can bring it back to the US and we can work on that together. What we offer is several practical solutions. On the security side, we talk about Japan and Korea being able to help build American ships.