Ryan Sean Adams

I mean, that shouldn't have been the default configuration.

There were some security issues with respect to that.

So there's a set of things that layer zero could have done differently.

Yeah.

KelpDAO, to your point, I suppose they shouldn't have configured things and trusted Layer Zero in the way that they did without really investigating, okay, how could this bridge fail and in what ways?

Because ultimately, it's their customers that were affected, all of the RSE holders.

And then I guess on the Aave side, they let this collateral into their global shared risk platform for all collateral.

So they looked at RSE and they didn't discount it from a risk perspective in the way maybe they should have.

Maybe they let too much in, for instance.

Maybe they didn't assign a risk profile that would say like, okay, this is significantly more risky because we've daisy chained all of these

different bridges and layer twos together, it's more risky than just plain old vanilla wrapped ETH, which is what a lot of their depositors actually, you know, have is wrapped ETH.

So Aave should have risk assessed this more.

Layer zero should have had more security, better defaults, particularly with this amount of money.

KelpDAO shouldn't have used layer zero in this way.

Is that roughly fair in terms of Odysseus where you design the detailed blame here?

There's another party that maybe we can assign some blame, or maybe this is a system or structure problem.

Odysseus, you just mentioned that so many of these are bridge hacks.

And the thing that we just saw this week was yet another bridge hack.

Maybe it's a fault of the architecture and the system that we've built on top of DeFi and Ethereum that we have to depend on all of these bridges in the first place.

And you could say, and I've seen some make this argument that this is downstream a result of the Layer 2 roadmap, for instance, where...