Ryan Sean Adams

The hack didn't happen on layer one mainnet.

It happened because we had bridges to different L2 type systems.

And you could also say, well, maybe it's the fault of the technology.

We've relied on these optimistic roll up seven day withdrawal type bridges.

The UX and the friction behind that has been so terrible that we've had to rely on

maybe I'm oversimplifying this, but like multi-sig style, weaker bridge type configurations of the type that layer zero put in place.

And we just had to do that or else what?

Or else DeFi wouldn't grow.

Or else we'd have no new users.

And that was downstream of Ethereum layer one, not having the technology or a scaling strategy.

And so we've pushed things into more rickety, less secure solutions just for UX and for users.

Do you think that's a credible charge that just like the architecture is to blame here?

Dan, would Aave v4 have reduced the exposure here?

It's just like the idea of Aave v4 is you have kind of some separation of risk and pools, you know, maybe in some way that Morpho separates some of that risk.

Would that have helped here?

There's another wrinkle to this story, which has led to a philosophical question for crypto and to DeFi.

And that was something that happened yesterday, which we'll call this the Arbitrum recovery.

So there was about 30,000 stolen Ether in the hacker's hands on the Layer 2 Arbitrum.

So this is Arbitrum 1, of course, so off of Ethereum and on the Layer 2.

At some point yesterday, Arbitrum Security Council used emergency powers to freeze and move those funds to a locked wallet.