Sarah Walker

And I really like some of the stuff that Stephen's doing with his physics project, but don't agree with a lot of the foundations of it. But I think the space is really fun that he's exploring. you know, there's this assumption that computation is at the base of reality. And I kind of see it at the top of reality, not at the base, because I think computation was built by our biosphere.

It's something that happened after many billion years of evolution. And it doesn't happen in every physical object. It only happens in some of them. And I think one of the reasons that we feel like the universe is computational is because it's so easy for us as things that have the theory of computation in our minds.

It's something that happened after many billion years of evolution. And it doesn't happen in every physical object. It only happens in some of them. And I think one of the reasons that we feel like the universe is computational is because it's so easy for us as things that have the theory of computation in our minds.

It's something that happened after many billion years of evolution. And it doesn't happen in every physical object. It only happens in some of them. And I think one of the reasons that we feel like the universe is computational is because it's so easy for us as things that have the theory of computation in our minds.

And actually, in some sense, it might be related to the functioning of our minds and how we build languages to describe the world and sets of relations to describe the world. But it's easy for us to go out into the world and build computers. And then we mistake our ability to do that with assuming that the world is computational. And I'll give you a really simple example.

And actually, in some sense, it might be related to the functioning of our minds and how we build languages to describe the world and sets of relations to describe the world. But it's easy for us to go out into the world and build computers. And then we mistake our ability to do that with assuming that the world is computational. And I'll give you a really simple example.

And actually, in some sense, it might be related to the functioning of our minds and how we build languages to describe the world and sets of relations to describe the world. But it's easy for us to go out into the world and build computers. And then we mistake our ability to do that with assuming that the world is computational. And I'll give you a really simple example.

This one came from John Conway. I one time had a conversation with him, which was really delightful. He was really fun. But he was pointing out that if you string lights in a barn, you can program them to have your favorite one-dimensional CA, and you might even be able to make them be capable of universal computation. Is universal computation a feature of the string lights?

This one came from John Conway. I one time had a conversation with him, which was really delightful. He was really fun. But he was pointing out that if you string lights in a barn, you can program them to have your favorite one-dimensional CA, and you might even be able to make them be capable of universal computation. Is universal computation a feature of the string lights?

This one came from John Conway. I one time had a conversation with him, which was really delightful. He was really fun. But he was pointing out that if you string lights in a barn, you can program them to have your favorite one-dimensional CA, and you might even be able to make them be capable of universal computation. Is universal computation a feature of the string lights?

No, it's probably not. It's a feature of the fact that you as a programmer had a theory that you could embed in the physical architecture of the string lights. Now, what happens, though, is we get confused by this kind of distinction between us as agents in the world that actually can transfer things that life does onto other physical substrates with what the world is.

No, it's probably not. It's a feature of the fact that you as a programmer had a theory that you could embed in the physical architecture of the string lights. Now, what happens, though, is we get confused by this kind of distinction between us as agents in the world that actually can transfer things that life does onto other physical substrates with what the world is.

No, it's probably not. It's a feature of the fact that you as a programmer had a theory that you could embed in the physical architecture of the string lights. Now, what happens, though, is we get confused by this kind of distinction between us as agents in the world that actually can transfer things that life does onto other physical substrates with what the world is.

And so, for example, you'll see people, you know, doing studying the mathematics of chemical reaction networks and saying, well, chemistry is Turing universal or studying the laws of physics and saying the laws of physics are Turing universal. But any time that you want to do that, you always have to prepare an initial state.

And so, for example, you'll see people, you know, doing studying the mathematics of chemical reaction networks and saying, well, chemistry is Turing universal or studying the laws of physics and saying the laws of physics are Turing universal. But any time that you want to do that, you always have to prepare an initial state.

And so, for example, you'll see people, you know, doing studying the mathematics of chemical reaction networks and saying, well, chemistry is Turing universal or studying the laws of physics and saying the laws of physics are Turing universal. But any time that you want to do that, you always have to prepare an initial state.

You have to, you know, you have to constrain the rule space and then you have to actually be able to demonstrate the properties of computation. And all of that requires an agent or a designer to be able to do that.

You have to, you know, you have to constrain the rule space and then you have to actually be able to demonstrate the properties of computation. And all of that requires an agent or a designer to be able to do that.

You have to, you know, you have to constrain the rule space and then you have to actually be able to demonstrate the properties of computation. And all of that requires an agent or a designer to be able to do that.

I think that's the intuition that people have derived from it. The intuition I get from cellular automata is that the flat space of an initial condition in a fixed dynamical law is not rich enough to describe an open-ended generation process. And so the way I see cellular automata is they're embedded slices in a much larger causal structure.