Serhii Plokhy

And Donbass is a classical rust belt, and we know what happens with the cities that were part of the first or second wave of industrialization in the United States and globally. We know about social problems that exist in those places. Donbass is probably the most dramatic and tragic case of implosion of the Rust Belt, with the mines not anymore producing at the acceptable price.

And Donbass is a classical rust belt, and we know what happens with the cities that were part of the first or second wave of industrialization in the United States and globally. We know about social problems that exist in those places. Donbass is probably the most dramatic and tragic case of implosion of the Rust Belt, with the mines not anymore producing at the acceptable price.

And Donbass is a classical rust belt, and we know what happens with the cities that were part of the first or second wave of industrialization in the United States and globally. We know about social problems that exist in those places. Donbass is probably the most dramatic and tragic case of implosion of the Rust Belt, with the mines not anymore producing at the acceptable price.

The coal that they used to produce is people losing jobs. with the politicians looking for subsidies as opposed to trying very unpopular measures of dealing something and bringing new money and new investment into the region. So all of that became part of the story that made it easy for Russia, for the Russian Federation to destabilize the situation.

The coal that they used to produce is people losing jobs. with the politicians looking for subsidies as opposed to trying very unpopular measures of dealing something and bringing new money and new investment into the region. So all of that became part of the story that made it easy for Russia, for the Russian Federation to destabilize the situation.

The coal that they used to produce is people losing jobs. with the politicians looking for subsidies as opposed to trying very unpopular measures of dealing something and bringing new money and new investment into the region. So all of that became part of the story that made it easy for Russia, for the Russian Federation to destabilize the situation.

We have interviews with Mr. Gherkin, who is saying that he was the first who pulled the trigger and fired the shot. In that war, he became the Minister of Defense in the Donetsk People's Republic. You look at the prime minister, he is another person with Moscow residency permit.

We have interviews with Mr. Gherkin, who is saying that he was the first who pulled the trigger and fired the shot. In that war, he became the Minister of Defense in the Donetsk People's Republic. You look at the prime minister, he is another person with Moscow residency permit.

We have interviews with Mr. Gherkin, who is saying that he was the first who pulled the trigger and fired the shot. In that war, he became the Minister of Defense in the Donetsk People's Republic. You look at the prime minister, he is another person with Moscow residency permit.

So you see key figures in those positions at the start and the beginning, not being Russians from Ukraine, but being Russians from Russia and Russians from Moscow, closely connected to the government structure and intelligence structure and so on.

So you see key figures in those positions at the start and the beginning, not being Russians from Ukraine, but being Russians from Russia and Russians from Moscow, closely connected to the government structure and intelligence structure and so on.

So you see key figures in those positions at the start and the beginning, not being Russians from Ukraine, but being Russians from Russia and Russians from Moscow, closely connected to the government structure and intelligence structure and so on.

So that is the start and the beginning, but the way how it exploded, the way it did, was also a combination of the economic and ethnocultural and linguistic factors.

So that is the start and the beginning, but the way how it exploded, the way it did, was also a combination of the economic and ethnocultural and linguistic factors.

So that is the start and the beginning, but the way how it exploded, the way it did, was also a combination of the economic and ethnocultural and linguistic factors.

What we see, this is certainly the argument. This is certainly the argument. And a pretext, because what we see there is that there would be no, and there was no independent mobilization in Crimea either, in Crimea or in Donbass, without Russian presence.

What we see, this is certainly the argument. This is certainly the argument. And a pretext, because what we see there is that there would be no, and there was no independent mobilization in Crimea either, in Crimea or in Donbass, without Russian presence.

What we see, this is certainly the argument. This is certainly the argument. And a pretext, because what we see there is that there would be no, and there was no independent mobilization in Crimea either, in Crimea or in Donbass, without Russian presence.

Without Russian occupation, the fact of the Crimea, there would be no, and there was no before, at least in the previous five to six years, any mass mobilizations of Russians. There was none of such mobilizations in Donbas before Gherkin and other people with military with parts of military units showed up there. So it is an excuse. You've been to Ukraine.

Without Russian occupation, the fact of the Crimea, there would be no, and there was no before, at least in the previous five to six years, any mass mobilizations of Russians. There was none of such mobilizations in Donbas before Gherkin and other people with military with parts of military units showed up there. So it is an excuse. You've been to Ukraine.