Serhii Plokhy

The fact that he was with Patriarch Kirill is a very important factor for understanding where the idea is coming from. This is the idea that was dominant in the Russian Empire of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are really great Russians, little Russians, and white Russians, and that they constitute one people.

The fact that he was with Patriarch Kirill is a very important factor for understanding where the idea is coming from. This is the idea that was dominant in the Russian Empire of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are really great Russians, little Russians, and white Russians, and that they constitute one people.

The fact that he was with Patriarch Kirill is a very important factor for understanding where the idea is coming from. This is the idea that was dominant in the Russian Empire of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are really great Russians, little Russians, and white Russians, and that they constitute one people.

Yes, there are some dialectical differences. Yes, Ukrainians sing well. Yes, they dance funny. But overall, that doesn't matter. And that idea actually was really destroyed, mostly destroyed by the revolution of 1917. Because it wasn't just social revolution. That's how it is understood in the U.S. and a good part of the world. It was also a national revolution. It was an empire.

Yes, there are some dialectical differences. Yes, Ukrainians sing well. Yes, they dance funny. But overall, that doesn't matter. And that idea actually was really destroyed, mostly destroyed by the revolution of 1917. Because it wasn't just social revolution. That's how it is understood in the U.S. and a good part of the world. It was also a national revolution. It was an empire.

Yes, there are some dialectical differences. Yes, Ukrainians sing well. Yes, they dance funny. But overall, that doesn't matter. And that idea actually was really destroyed, mostly destroyed by the revolution of 1917. Because it wasn't just social revolution. That's how it is understood in the U.S. and a good part of the world. It was also a national revolution. It was an empire.

It was a revolution in the Russian Empire. And to bring this piece of empire back within the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks had to make concessions.

It was a revolution in the Russian Empire. And to bring this piece of empire back within the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks had to make concessions.

It was a revolution in the Russian Empire. And to bring this piece of empire back within the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks had to make concessions.

And one of those concessions was to recognition of the existence of Ukrainians as a separate nation, Belarusians as a separate nation, Russians as a separate nation, endowing them with their own territorial borders, with institutions, and so on and so forth. But there was one institution that was not reformed. That institution was called the Russian Orthodox Church.

And one of those concessions was to recognition of the existence of Ukrainians as a separate nation, Belarusians as a separate nation, Russians as a separate nation, endowing them with their own territorial borders, with institutions, and so on and so forth. But there was one institution that was not reformed. That institution was called the Russian Orthodox Church.

And one of those concessions was to recognition of the existence of Ukrainians as a separate nation, Belarusians as a separate nation, Russians as a separate nation, endowing them with their own territorial borders, with institutions, and so on and so forth. But there was one institution that was not reformed. That institution was called the Russian Orthodox Church.

Because one of the ways that Bolsheviks dealt with it, they couldn't eradicate religion completely, but they arrested the development of the religion and thinking and theology on the level as it existed before the revolution of 1917.

Because one of the ways that Bolsheviks dealt with it, they couldn't eradicate religion completely, but they arrested the development of the religion and thinking and theology on the level as it existed before the revolution of 1917.

Because one of the ways that Bolsheviks dealt with it, they couldn't eradicate religion completely, but they arrested the development of the religion and thinking and theology on the level as it existed before the revolution of 1917.

So, the Russian Orthodox Church of 1917 continued to be the Russian Orthodox Church in 1991 and in 2013, continuing the same imperial mantra of the existence of one big Russian nation, one unified people. When you see the formation of the ideas about nations, about foreign policy in the Russian Empire after 1991, they're going back to the pre-Bolshevik times. Ukrainians do that as well.

So, the Russian Orthodox Church of 1917 continued to be the Russian Orthodox Church in 1991 and in 2013, continuing the same imperial mantra of the existence of one big Russian nation, one unified people. When you see the formation of the ideas about nations, about foreign policy in the Russian Empire after 1991, they're going back to the pre-Bolshevik times. Ukrainians do that as well.

So, the Russian Orthodox Church of 1917 continued to be the Russian Orthodox Church in 1991 and in 2013, continuing the same imperial mantra of the existence of one big Russian nation, one unified people. When you see the formation of the ideas about nations, about foreign policy in the Russian Empire after 1991, they're going back to the pre-Bolshevik times. Ukrainians do that as well.

Estonians do that as well. The difference is that when Ukrainians go back, they go back to the pre-1917, the intellectual fathers and writings of basically liberal nationalism. Or sometimes they go to the radical nationalism of Bandera, which would be not pre-1917, but pre-1945. When the Russians go to pre-Bolshevik past, looking for the ideas, looking for inspiration, looking for the narratives.

Estonians do that as well. The difference is that when Ukrainians go back, they go back to the pre-1917, the intellectual fathers and writings of basically liberal nationalism. Or sometimes they go to the radical nationalism of Bandera, which would be not pre-1917, but pre-1945. When the Russians go to pre-Bolshevik past, looking for the ideas, looking for inspiration, looking for the narratives.