Shyam Sankar

So it doesn't matter if it's one drone or a thousand drones, it's going to have the efficacy of being able to stop them and block them.

Yeah, it's putting up an entire wall of energy. And that is, you know, it's a very clever approach to solve the problem. I think we're going to need defense in depth with an approach like this. When you think about the UAS problem, it is a massive offset that our adversaries have against us. You know, how many million dollar missiles can you shoot at $200 drones, even $2,000 drones?

Yeah, it's putting up an entire wall of energy. And that is, you know, it's a very clever approach to solve the problem. I think we're going to need defense in depth with an approach like this. When you think about the UAS problem, it is a massive offset that our adversaries have against us. You know, how many million dollar missiles can you shoot at $200 drones, even $2,000 drones?

Yeah, it's putting up an entire wall of energy. And that is, you know, it's a very clever approach to solve the problem. I think we're going to need defense in depth with an approach like this. When you think about the UAS problem, it is a massive offset that our adversaries have against us. You know, how many million dollar missiles can you shoot at $200 drones, even $2,000 drones?

You're going to lose that equation. And so we're going to need entirely different ways of thinking about this.

You're going to lose that equation. And so we're going to need entirely different ways of thinking about this.

You're going to lose that equation. And so we're going to need entirely different ways of thinking about this.

Now, this challenges, so there's a question of how quickly can the force adapt these things and recognizing that you're not going to have just one answer, that you're going to actually have to have a series of answers that mean that you're not afraid of putting your destroyers into a position to be relevant anymore. And that's the greatest threat.

Now, this challenges, so there's a question of how quickly can the force adapt these things and recognizing that you're not going to have just one answer, that you're going to actually have to have a series of answers that mean that you're not afraid of putting your destroyers into a position to be relevant anymore. And that's the greatest threat.

Now, this challenges, so there's a question of how quickly can the force adapt these things and recognizing that you're not going to have just one answer, that you're going to actually have to have a series of answers that mean that you're not afraid of putting your destroyers into a position to be relevant anymore. And that's the greatest threat.

So when I look at Ukraine, there are really three lessons I take away. And this is one of them. The Ukrainians, people often look and say, wow, isn't it amazing that they sunk half the Russian black sea fleet, even though they don't have a Navy? And I say, no, no, no, no. It's because they didn't have a Navy.

So when I look at Ukraine, there are really three lessons I take away. And this is one of them. The Ukrainians, people often look and say, wow, isn't it amazing that they sunk half the Russian black sea fleet, even though they don't have a Navy? And I say, no, no, no, no. It's because they didn't have a Navy.

So when I look at Ukraine, there are really three lessons I take away. And this is one of them. The Ukrainians, people often look and say, wow, isn't it amazing that they sunk half the Russian black sea fleet, even though they don't have a Navy? And I say, no, no, no, no. It's because they didn't have a Navy.

That's how they could conceive of an entirely different force structure that had sea dues, essentially, these cheap explosive munition drones that were guidable with a Starlink. It's an entirely different conception of the problem that I think a big surface Navy could get there eventually, but it's not gonna get there as quickly or as dynamically. That's one lesson.

That's how they could conceive of an entirely different force structure that had sea dues, essentially, these cheap explosive munition drones that were guidable with a Starlink. It's an entirely different conception of the problem that I think a big surface Navy could get there eventually, but it's not gonna get there as quickly or as dynamically. That's one lesson.

That's how they could conceive of an entirely different force structure that had sea dues, essentially, these cheap explosive munition drones that were guidable with a Starlink. It's an entirely different conception of the problem that I think a big surface Navy could get there eventually, but it's not gonna get there as quickly or as dynamically. That's one lesson.

The second one is we should have realized we had a five alarm fire when we went through 10 years of 155 production in 10 weeks. And I think in World War II, we used to make like 500,000 shells a month. And now we're struggling to make roughly one-tenth that, 65,000 or so. We've had some time. Ukraine didn't happen last week. We've had some time.

The second one is we should have realized we had a five alarm fire when we went through 10 years of 155 production in 10 weeks. And I think in World War II, we used to make like 500,000 shells a month. And now we're struggling to make roughly one-tenth that, 65,000 or so. We've had some time. Ukraine didn't happen last week. We've had some time.

The second one is we should have realized we had a five alarm fire when we went through 10 years of 155 production in 10 weeks. And I think in World War II, we used to make like 500,000 shells a month. And now we're struggling to make roughly one-tenth that, 65,000 or so. We've had some time. Ukraine didn't happen last week. We've had some time.

What lessons can we take about what it's going to take to actually ramp up the industrial base as a consequence? The lesson from that is that we got it wrong. We thought the stockpile was the deterrent. If we could go to our adversaries and say, look at how much stuff we have sitting on the stock they'd be scared. It's not. The deterrent is your ability to produce the stockpile.