Stephen Miran

And I think, as you're pointing out, that long yields moving higher meant that I was actually kind of right.

You know, I think that that bears that out.

This time, thus far, and still early days, the meeting was, you know, two weeks ago, three weeks ago.

You know, it's still early days.

But, you know, thus far, we haven't seen that type of increase in long yields that we saw last year.

If it were to happen, the first thing I would want to do is ask why, right?

Why is it happening?

And if I came to the conclusion that it was happening because it was inappropriate to cut rates because my inflation analysis was wrong or my analysis of neutral or the output gap was wrong, then the first thing to do is probably to reverse course on the front rate.

My view is probably not to sort of resort to balance sheet at the first opportunity, that balance sheet is the tool that you use when your more standard tools can't work for the problem at hand.

I don't think my position is as extreme as you make it sound.

My dots for next year and the year after are not so dissimilar from the rest of the committee.

All that's different is the fact that I want to get there a little bit faster.

I think that most people on the Fed, they operate with a

In your Taylor rule application, you probably have an inertial parameter where there's a sluggish adjustment.

So wherever policy should be set, you sort of phase it in slowly from where you are.

So if you're wildly off from where you are now, there would still be a very slow adjustment to where policy should be set.

And I think that that's the type of thing that some people sort of default have in their mind.

That's not my view.

My view is that if policy is out of whack, you should adjust at a reasonably brisk pace.

In part because if you stay restrictive for too long, you really run the risk of bringing an output gap materially wider that you don't want.