Stephen Wolfram

I mean, and as we, you know, we have more precise, and by the way, there are little sort of microscopic violations of the second law of thermodynamics that you can start to have when you have more precise measurements of where precisely molecules are.

But on a large scale, when you have enough molecules, we're not tracing all those molecules and we just don't have the computational resources to do that.

To imagine what an observer who is not computationally bounded would be like

it's an interesting thing because, okay, so what does computational boundedness mean?

Among other things, it means we conclude that definite things happen.

We go, we take all this complexity of the world and we make a decision.

We're going to turn left or turn right.

And that is kind of reducing all this kind of detail into we're observing it.

We're sort of crushing it down to this one thing.

And that, if we didn't do that,

we wouldn't have all this sort of symbolic structure that we build up that lets us think things through with our finite minds.

We'd be sort of one with the universe.

Yeah, so content to not simplify.

Yes.

If we didn't simplify, then we wouldn't be like us.

We would be like the universe, like the intrinsic universe, but not having experiences like the experiences we have where we, for example, conclude that definite things happen.

We have this notion of being able to make narrative statements.

So here's how that, I think, plays out.

Vibrations.

So, I mean, in this, we talk about this rulliad, this space of all possible computations.