Steve Ballmer

They were selling a lot of computers and making profit also. They would have been making more profit than we were at the time, just the way pricing worked. There was a little twisty in here, though, I should throw at you if you're curious.

These things had something called the BIOS, basic input output system, which was the lowest, lowest layer of firmware, sort of first level software built into the hardware. And IBM had its own BIOS. And some applications became BIOS dependent. And so then the question is, who was going to do an IBM compatible BIOS? We weren't going to get into that game. We didn't want to have that.

These things had something called the BIOS, basic input output system, which was the lowest, lowest layer of firmware, sort of first level software built into the hardware. And IBM had its own BIOS. And some applications became BIOS dependent. And so then the question is, who was going to do an IBM compatible BIOS? We weren't going to get into that game. We didn't want to have that.

intellectual property, other arguments, but there were people then. Compaq ultimately became the big company. Compaq became the big company. I don't remember whether they wrote their own IBM-compatible BIOS, but they were the first one to be IBM-compatible. There were plenty of people who ran MS-DOS who were actually not IBM-compatible because they didn't do a compatible BIOS.

intellectual property, other arguments, but there were people then. Compaq ultimately became the big company. Compaq became the big company. I don't remember whether they wrote their own IBM-compatible BIOS, but they were the first one to be IBM-compatible. There were plenty of people who ran MS-DOS who were actually not IBM-compatible because they didn't do a compatible BIOS.

One thing you have to remember, because we live in the modern world now, when you say all the developers...

One thing you have to remember, because we live in the modern world now, when you say all the developers...

There were a couple of software companies that made packages for IBM mainframes, but almost everything was custom. So really, I would say we, a few other companies, but I would say we defined what a modern software business looked like.

There were a couple of software companies that made packages for IBM mainframes, but almost everything was custom. So really, I would say we, a few other companies, but I would say we defined what a modern software business looked like.

And the notion that there could be lots of developers, and there were some, but it's not like we think today, oh, there was developers doing lots of standard applications. No. And there was no licensing model, no business model, no nothing.

And the notion that there could be lots of developers, and there were some, but it's not like we think today, oh, there was developers doing lots of standard applications. No. And there was no licensing model, no business model, no nothing.

I mean, you sort of can't blame them because there was nothing to build off of. But yeah. Yeah. One of the things my little PowerPoint here says is luck is important in the creation of great companies. It is. And a lot of people sort of say we're masters of the universe. We figure everything out. We never have any luck. And it's because we're so talented.

I mean, you sort of can't blame them because there was nothing to build off of. But yeah. Yeah. One of the things my little PowerPoint here says is luck is important in the creation of great companies. It is. And a lot of people sort of say we're masters of the universe. We figure everything out. We never have any luck. And it's because we're so talented.

Sure, there are talented people and hardworking people. Most people have a little luck in their story. And this was our big luck.

Sure, there are talented people and hardworking people. Most people have a little luck in their story. And this was our big luck.

No. No. I can't remember what year it would have been. But Andy Grove, who was running Intel at the time, said, yeah, pretty soon we'll be selling 100 million PCs a year. Sometime in the 80s, I think. It might have even been in the 90s. And Bill and I laughed and said, ah, that's not going to happen. We invested big time. And if it did happen, we said, that's great. We're not going to underinvest.

No. No. I can't remember what year it would have been. But Andy Grove, who was running Intel at the time, said, yeah, pretty soon we'll be selling 100 million PCs a year. Sometime in the 80s, I think. It might have even been in the 90s. And Bill and I laughed and said, ah, that's not going to happen. We invested big time. And if it did happen, we said, that's great. We're not going to underinvest.

But we thought, ah, he's crazy. This market will never grow like that. I would say we classically under-forecast. That was kind of our tendency.

But we thought, ah, he's crazy. This market will never grow like that. I would say we classically under-forecast. That was kind of our tendency.

The personal computing layer. I think by the mid to late 80s, I mean, you make it sound very strong. No, we didn't feel very strong. Yeah. There was IBM, man. IBM was still the sun, the moon, and the stars. That didn't change. I would say we didn't drop that theory well into the 2000s. Into the 2000s, Lotus Notes was coming for us, and that was mid-'90s and beyond.