Tal Zaks

And we need to be super careful and super mindful of the policy implications that we have at the society level of what we think is important and how we reimburse these efforts, because it is the return on investment engine that ultimately drives the innovation that benefits not just us today, but our kids and our grandkids in the future.

And we need to be super careful and super mindful of the policy implications that we have at the society level of what we think is important and how we reimburse these efforts, because it is the return on investment engine that ultimately drives the innovation that benefits not just us today, but our kids and our grandkids in the future.

As I joined this field, as I became an investor, one of the more interesting books I read is Scott Kapoor's The Secret of Sandhill Road, where Andreessen Hurwitz talks about what it takes to be a VC investor in tech. And they have a mindset where their returns can be 1,000 to 1, and so they're okay to win only 1 in 100. The math still works. In our space, that actually doesn't work like that.

As I joined this field, as I became an investor, one of the more interesting books I read is Scott Kapoor's The Secret of Sandhill Road, where Andreessen Hurwitz talks about what it takes to be a VC investor in tech. And they have a mindset where their returns can be 1,000 to 1, and so they're okay to win only 1 in 100. The math still works. In our space, that actually doesn't work like that.

gigantic. To get a 10x return for us is wonderful, not something you see commonly. And to get a larger than 10x return is rare. So we shoot for 3x to 4x returns. 5x return is a great outcome for us, which means that we can't afford to get as much wrong as the tech folks can. because the upside is just not as much.

gigantic. To get a 10x return for us is wonderful, not something you see commonly. And to get a larger than 10x return is rare. So we shoot for 3x to 4x returns. 5x return is a great outcome for us, which means that we can't afford to get as much wrong as the tech folks can. because the upside is just not as much.

It means that when you look at your investment portfolio, you have to take a very careful view of the balance of risk. Now, each individual company, you got to, as Carl Gordon, my boss says, somebody has got to come and pound the table and believing that this thing's going to work. There's nobody around to pound the table. We're not making the investment.

It means that when you look at your investment portfolio, you have to take a very careful view of the balance of risk. Now, each individual company, you got to, as Carl Gordon, my boss says, somebody has got to come and pound the table and believing that this thing's going to work. There's nobody around to pound the table. We're not making the investment.

So there's got to be that sense of belief in the content and the people and the potential. We tried to take a very hard-nosed look at what the probability of success is across the myriad of dimensions. And there are, as I said, many Now, what do we get wrong? We probably get wrong each and every one of the dimensions. Sometimes we get the team wrong. Sometimes we get the science wrong.

So there's got to be that sense of belief in the content and the people and the potential. We tried to take a very hard-nosed look at what the probability of success is across the myriad of dimensions. And there are, as I said, many Now, what do we get wrong? We probably get wrong each and every one of the dimensions. Sometimes we get the team wrong. Sometimes we get the science wrong.

Sometimes we get the clinical application wrong. And sometimes we get the commercial opportunity wrong. I don't know that there's any one that stands out because we try to look at the portfolio, but I think the one that we get probably the most wrong is the one that is still the hardest to predict, which is what is the magnitude of clinical benefit that this will bring?

Sometimes we get the clinical application wrong. And sometimes we get the commercial opportunity wrong. I don't know that there's any one that stands out because we try to look at the portfolio, but I think the one that we get probably the most wrong is the one that is still the hardest to predict, which is what is the magnitude of clinical benefit that this will bring?

because clinical benefit is not a black and white. We typically invest in things where we understand the biology and we think we can de-risk it along the way. Okay, that's gonna work. And then we have a belief in the drug because we understand the preclinical pharmacology and that's all good. And so it should work to some extent in the clinic, but how good is it gonna be?

because clinical benefit is not a black and white. We typically invest in things where we understand the biology and we think we can de-risk it along the way. Okay, that's gonna work. And then we have a belief in the drug because we understand the preclinical pharmacology and that's all good. And so it should work to some extent in the clinic, but how good is it gonna be?

And in a world which is so competitive, It can't just be something that somebody has already done before or even slightly worse. That's going to be dead. So it's got to somehow differentiate. It's got to somehow be better. It's got to offer something. And that's probably the part that's the most challenging to predict.

And in a world which is so competitive, It can't just be something that somebody has already done before or even slightly worse. That's going to be dead. So it's got to somehow differentiate. It's got to somehow be better. It's got to offer something. And that's probably the part that's the most challenging to predict.

There's a wonderful obituary that Malcolm Gladwell wrote years ago of Albert Hirshberg. who was an economist in the prior century. His whole economic thesis was that what drives economic progress is the naivete of thinking how easy it's gonna be.

There's a wonderful obituary that Malcolm Gladwell wrote years ago of Albert Hirshberg. who was an economist in the prior century. His whole economic thesis was that what drives economic progress is the naivete of thinking how easy it's gonna be.

You get excited about an idea, and the example he gives is back when they had to dig a tunnel through the Hoosac Mountains to connect the Boston area with the Hudson Valley. And they said, this is critical for economic development, so what's it gonna take?

You get excited about an idea, and the example he gives is back when they had to dig a tunnel through the Hoosac Mountains to connect the Boston area with the Hudson Valley. And they said, this is critical for economic development, so what's it gonna take?