Trevor Collins

Imagine how many other planes felt like they were dancing on a knife's edge.

Oh my gosh, more than you want to know.

Just like more than you want to know.

So again, because of this, the FAA proposed a rule in 2005 that certain aircraft identified with having high flammability tanks, like the one in this incident because the heat exchange being right next to it, would need to have a means to reduce the flammability installed.

I don't know what that looks like.

It could be some sort of venting.

It could be some sort of artificial cooling to reduce the vapors.

I'm sure they have a plethora of fancy options, but these weren't the only two rules to come out of TWA 800.

The FAA also instated one target maintenance on wiring systems after they found to have deficiencies, right?

So there were deficiencies found on TWA 800.

and on other aircraft.

And so they're saying, let's look at that, let's learn from it, and now let's create a target maintenance sort of schedule for wiring systems to reduce chafing, to reduce where the sheath that keeps it insulated.

100%.

All of that sort of stuff.

They also instated the reduction of fuel tank flammability in transport category airplanes.

It's the name of this thing here, this rule.

But this rule required, quote, measures to assess and reduce the flammability exposure of certain transport airplane fuel tanks.

Lots learned, lots to glean out of this horrible tragedy, but ultimately a very interesting case because of the construction efforts, because of these interesting, I would almost say now fringe conspiracy holdouts for this confusion of explosive residue.

Was it there?

Was it not there?