Trita Parsi

I think it could be other things.

Sharing the toll seems to be something that at least the Iranians initially rejected.

It could be other things, you know, what the currency would be in which the tolls would take place in.

It could be that the Iranians would use a percentage of the toll revenues not to give it to the U.S., but to buy things from the U.S.

ideas, et cetera, that can be further explored on that.

And I think if it ends up becoming some arrangement in which both sides are involved in it one way or another, it can help stabilize the situation because the critical thing is to make sure that the strait opens.

The Iranian objective is not to close the straits.

The Iranian objective is to use the control of the straits in order to reestablish economic relations with countries that have left the Iranian market.

The South Koreans have already come to Iran.

The Japanese are about to do their own negotiation.

These are countries in Asia that used to have extensive economic relations with Iran, but were chased out of the market because of the sanctions, because the US pressure on them was very intense.

Now the Iranians are pressuring them back in through the Strait of Hormuz.

It's not to close it.

Yeah, this is- But I think it's, there's one thing I think is very important to understand in which the Iranians may actually have ended up in a relatively weaker position than they were in before.

See, the United States or Trump could not end the war without some sort of arrangement with Iran because the Iranians had a say in it.

And this kind of forced him into a situation in which he had to ask for negotiations.

But now that the Iranians have accepted a ceasefire,

I think the tables have turned a little bit.

The United States can now actually walk away from these talks and end up in a scenario in which the Iranians are controlling the straits, which is, you know, from the U.S.

perspective, not good, but it's not devastating.