Zack Beauchamp

Yeah, I mean, before the show, you and I were talking about liberalism. So my political lodestar is John Rawls in his book, Political Liberalism. And Rawls has this idea of an overlapping consensus. People don't agree on everything important. They don't even agree on everything that's an important moral thing.

Yeah, I mean, before the show, you and I were talking about liberalism. So my political lodestar is John Rawls in his book, Political Liberalism. And Rawls has this idea of an overlapping consensus. People don't agree on everything important. They don't even agree on everything that's an important moral thing.

In fact, his basic position is there are certain disagreements that cannot be resolved through politics that no one can resolve. Right. What makes a liberal democratic polity function is that we agree at least on how to resolve those disagreements, right, and the bounds in which those disagreements take place.

In fact, his basic position is there are certain disagreements that cannot be resolved through politics that no one can resolve. Right. What makes a liberal democratic polity function is that we agree at least on how to resolve those disagreements, right, and the bounds in which those disagreements take place.

For instance, that it's wrong to coerce people, to force them to act contrary to their own beliefs or to impose a vision of the good life onto certain people. And I think a lot of the conflict in politics right now is the result of the American overlapping consensus breaking down.

For instance, that it's wrong to coerce people, to force them to act contrary to their own beliefs or to impose a vision of the good life onto certain people. And I think a lot of the conflict in politics right now is the result of the American overlapping consensus breaking down.

And a lot of the disagreements between different factions right now are over who broke it and why and whether or not it can be repaired. So the Chris Ruffo position, right, I've interviewed Chris. And when you talk to him, his view is the liberals aren't really liberals. They're leftist authoritarians in liberal clothing. They are basically the ideological heirs of Maoists.

And a lot of the disagreements between different factions right now are over who broke it and why and whether or not it can be repaired. So the Chris Ruffo position, right, I've interviewed Chris. And when you talk to him, his view is the liberals aren't really liberals. They're leftist authoritarians in liberal clothing. They are basically the ideological heirs of Maoists.

And they went about trying to impose their sort of Maoist left-wing cultural agenda on the United States. And I'm just trying to fix that. In that light, Chris's project sounds almost Rawlsian.

And they went about trying to impose their sort of Maoist left-wing cultural agenda on the United States. And I'm just trying to fix that. In that light, Chris's project sounds almost Rawlsian.

Yes, that's right.

Yes, that's right.

It's not true, right? It doesn't stand the test of, you know, what he's actually done, and in part because his diagnosis is really unfair. If you look at the history of American liberalism or the American left, the new left of the 1960s, the Maoist radicals he's talking about, did not win. They did not win the war of ideas on the left, as he assumes that they did.

It's not true, right? It doesn't stand the test of, you know, what he's actually done, and in part because his diagnosis is really unfair. If you look at the history of American liberalism or the American left, the new left of the 1960s, the Maoist radicals he's talking about, did not win. They did not win the war of ideas on the left, as he assumes that they did.

But I think that if we're talking about what can happen next, it is possible that what happens next is years of chaos. One interesting parallel I heard when I was talking to Luke and Wei, actually, was Nepal, where you had a bunch of different factions who had totally, totally divergent ideas about the constitutional order, who would win elections and there'd be radical policy shifts for years.

But I think that if we're talking about what can happen next, it is possible that what happens next is years of chaos. One interesting parallel I heard when I was talking to Luke and Wei, actually, was Nepal, where you had a bunch of different factions who had totally, totally divergent ideas about the constitutional order, who would win elections and there'd be radical policy shifts for years.

And so it was years of chaos. That happening in the U.S., I think, is really a distinct possibility. It's also possible that we get a consolidated competitive authoritarian regime. Again, this whole conversation, I've not been ruling it out, just saying I think it's less likely.

And so it was years of chaos. That happening in the U.S., I think, is really a distinct possibility. It's also possible that we get a consolidated competitive authoritarian regime. Again, this whole conversation, I've not been ruling it out, just saying I think it's less likely.

But I think if we're to get onto the good path, right, we need to consider what it would take to rebuild a Rawlsian overlap and consensus on liberal democratic positions in the 21st century. And I don't have the answer here. I'm not sitting here like, I can tell you how to save liberalism. But I think the task should be stated clearly in this opportunity, this interregnum, as you describe it.

But I think if we're to get onto the good path, right, we need to consider what it would take to rebuild a Rawlsian overlap and consensus on liberal democratic positions in the 21st century. And I don't have the answer here. I'm not sitting here like, I can tell you how to save liberalism. But I think the task should be stated clearly in this opportunity, this interregnum, as you describe it.