Chapter 1: What is the concept of goal-models as opposed to utility functions?
On Goal Models By Richard Ngo Published on February 2, 2026 I'd like to reframe our understanding of the goals of intelligent agents to be in terms of goal models rather than utility functions. By a goal model I mean the same type of thing as a world model, only representing how you want the world to be, not how you think the world is.
However, note that this still a fairly inchoate idea, since I don't actually know what a world model is. The concept of goal models is broadly inspired by predictive processing, which treats both beliefs and goals as generative models, the former primarily predicting observations, the latter primarily predicting actions.
This is a very useful idea, which for example allows us to talk about the distance between a belief and a goal, and the process of moving towards a goal, neither of which makes sense from a reward-utility-function perspective. However, I'm dissatisfied by the idea of defining a world model as a generative model over observations.
It feels analogous to defining a parliament as a generative model over laws. Yes, technically we can think of parliaments as stochastically outputting laws, but actually the interesting part is in how they do so. In the case of parliaments, you have a process of internal disagreement and bargaining, which then leads to some compromise output.
In the case of world models, we can perhaps think of them as made up of many smaller, partial, generative models, which sometimes agree and sometimes disagree. The real question is in how they reach enough of a consensus to produce a single output prediction.
One potential model of that consensus formation process comes from the probabilistic dependency graph formalism, which is a version of Bayesian networks in which different nodes are allowed to disagree with each other. The most principled way to convert a PDG into a single distribution is to find the distribution which minimizes the inconsistency between all of its nodes.
PDGs seem promising in some ways, but I feel suspicious of any global symmetric of inconsistency. Instead I'm interested in scale-free approaches under which inconsistencies mostly get resolved locally, though it's worth noting that Oliver's proposed practical algorithm for inconsistency minimization is a local one.
It's also possible that the predictive processing to active inference people have a better model of this process which I don't know about, since I haven't made it very deep into that literature yet. Anyway, suppose we're thinking of goal models as generative models of observations for now. What does this buy us over understanding goals in terms of utility functions?
The key trade-off is that utility functions are global but shallow whereas goal models are local but deep. That is, we typically think of a utility function as something that takes as input any state or alternatively any trajectory of the world and spits out a real number.
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Chapter 2: How does predictive processing relate to beliefs and goals?
A rocket that's fixed on a target isn't calculating how good or bad it would be to miss in any given direction. Instead, it's constantly checking whether it's on track, then adjusting to maintain its trajectory. The question is whether we can think of intelligent agents as steering through much higher dimensional spaces in an analogous way.
I think this makes most sense when you're close enough to your goal. For example, we can think of a CEO as primarily trying to keep their company on a stable upwards trajectory. Conversely, a high school student who wants to be the CEO of a major company is so far away from their goal that it's hard to think of them as controlling their path towards it.
Instead, they first need to select between plans for becoming such a CEO based on how likely each plan is to succeed.
Similarly, a dancer or a musician is best described as carrying out a control process when practicing or performing, but needed to make a discrete choice of which piece to learn, and more generally which instrument or dance style to focus on, and even more generally which career path to pursue at all.
And of course a rocket needs to first select which target to focus on at all before it aims towards it. So it's tempting to think about selection as the outer loop and control as the inner loop. but I want to offer an alternative view.
Where do we even get the criteria on which we make selections? I think it's actually another control process, specifically, the process of controlling our identities. We have certain conceptions of ourselves, I'm a good person or if I'm successful or if people love me.
We then are constantly adjusting our lives and actions in order to maintain those identities, for example by selecting the goals and plans which are most consistent with them and looking away from evidence that might falsify our identities. So perhaps our outermost loop is a control process after all.
These identities, or identity models, are inherently local in the sense that they are about ourselves, not the wider world. If we each pursued our own individual goals and plans derived from our individual identities, then it would be hard for us to cooperate.
However, one way to scale up identity-based decision-making is to develop identities with the property that, when many people pursue them, those people become a distributed agent label to act in sync. This article was narrated by Type 3 Audio for Less Wrong. It was published on February 2, 2026.
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