Neither Confirm Nor Deny: British Intelligence, Lawless Agent Running and the Suppression of Truth
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How did John Ware first become involved reporting on the Troubles in Northern Ireland?
My next guest's introduction to the troubles in Northern Ireland was as a local newspaper reporter from Worcester in the 1970s sent a report on the local ads the young soldiers sent to the province. Over the years, his reports on the BBC's Panorama delved into the darker side of the war. His new book focuses on the murky world of intelligence gathering by UK agencies and the use of high-level informers within both Republican and Loyalist groupings. The book is called Neither Confirm Nor Deny, subtitled British Intelligence, Lawless Agent Running and the Suppression of the Truth. John Ware, good morning and welcome. Good morning. Now, the moral dilemma in the preface of the book is whether or not the norms of legal practice can be abandoned for some kind of greater good in times of state emergency.
That is how you present it to us.
What moral dilemma does 'Neither Confirm Nor Deny' present about breaking legal norms in emergencies?
Yes. I mean, essentially, if you're a state, a democratic state, combating... an insurgency, an armed insurgency in which not just combatants but innocent civilians are dying in considerable numbers. As a state, most states, every state would seek to advance this position by actionable intelligence, reliable intelligence.
Why was human intelligence prioritized during the 1970s–80s and what risks did that create?
And certainly in the 70s and 80s, with electronic means of intelligence gathering being not as sophisticated, anything like as sophisticated as they are now. Human intelligence was the premium, so many agents were recruited, and this presented this state with a dilemma because they were run largely outside of a legal framework.
And the question at the heart of it is, suppose you know that ordinary people, be they innocent or if they are, as you put it, competence, if their lives are being put in danger and the security forces in whatever branch they might work, become aware of this. Do they have an obligation to save that person's life or do they let everything go ahead in order to protect their informants?
Well, that was certainly the dilemma that confronted the state in a number of cases. We don't know how many cases, in other words, putting it bluntly, we don't know, we can't, I mean, I don't know in how many cases the lives of others were sacrificed in order to keep the agent in place. But what we do know is with a high degree of confidence is that, um, keeping agents in place source protection as it's known was the priority really. Um, and, um, in a competition between that and saving lives, it wasn't always quite clearly saving lives often did take what was the, what, was the outcome. But usually, only when the state was satisfied, it didn't compromise the cover of the agent. That's really the point.
But I just want to make another point.
What does the 'neither confirm nor deny' policy mean and where did it originate?
This compromise, these legal and moral compromises, which are at the heart of my book, as you say, didn't just relate to whether lives were, were sacrificed. It, it, it also, you know, impinged very significantly on the criminal justice system. And you'll, you'll probably recall that the, the defining mantra of ministers, British ministers was that this was the, the, the, the counterinsurgency was aimed at establishing the rule of law.
Why has the government chosen settlements over admitting liability in informant-related murder cases?
Well, well, The rule of law was largely absent on the covert side of dealing with the insurgency. That's really the point.
Now, the title of your book, Neither Confirm Nor Deny, where did that policy come from? How old is that policy?
Oh, well, it's decades old, and it doesn't just apply to the British government. It applies to several other governments. The USA use the same protocol when they want to evade awkward questions about intelligence and keep their adversaries guessing. But certainly it's been used by successive governments, and it is a protocol which – This government, as with previous governments, is extremely keen to keep intact.
Were British security agencies cooperative or competitive when running agents like Scappaticci and Nelson?
And we've seen that with the recent, in the last few days, revelation of substantial settlements offered by the government. to the families of relatives murdered by the Internal Security Unit, otherwise known as the Nutting Squad, the IRA's Internal Security Unit.
This was the outfit that Scappaticci was in charge of.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
How did John Ware first become involved reporting on the Troubles in Northern Ireland?
0:01–1:08
2
What moral dilemma does 'Neither Confirm Nor Deny' present about breaking legal norms in emergencies?
1:08–1:40
3
Why was human intelligence prioritized during the 1970s–80s and what risks did that create?
1:40–3:41
4
What does the 'neither confirm nor deny' policy mean and where did it originate?
3:41–4:15
5
Why has the government chosen settlements over admitting liability in informant-related murder cases?
4:15–5:11
6
Were British security agencies cooperative or competitive when running agents like Scappaticci and Nelson?
5:11–8:02
7
What motivated informers Brian Nelson and Freddy Scappaticci to work with security forces?
8:02–10:55
8
How does secrecy and denial hinder truth, reconciliation and confidence in policing in Northern Ireland?
10:55–18:24