American Philosophy Collection Vol 1 - Various
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What is the pragmatist claim that 'the real is simply what is experienced' and why does Woodbridge challenge it?
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Of What Sort is Cognitive Experience? By Frederick J. E. Woodbridge. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information, or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Of What Sort is Cognitive Experience? By Frederick J. E. Woodbridge. Professor Dewey's recent article in this journal, footnote, The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism, volume 2, number 15, page 393, end footnote, has definitely contributed to a clearer understanding of what the term real means to many advocates of immediate empiricism and pragmatism. The real is simply that which is experienced and as it is experienced. It would seem that there could be little further misunderstanding on that point.
The challenge to the pragmatist to tell what he means by reality appears, thus, to have been met successfully. If it were necessary to lend external authority to Professor Dewey's exposition, one might cite the ancient statement of Aristotle that reality is whatever can be the subject of investigation. From such a definition of reality, it is evident that reals may differ from one another in any way in which they are found to differ. and that consequently there may be true reals and false reals if warrant can be found for such a distinction among the things which may be investigated there is no need of an elaborate proof to show that this definition in spite of rather just because of its simplicity and obviousness is the only fruitful definition of reality
The history of thought is an evidence. To the metaphysician it is a real blessing, for it frees him from the trivial question whether there is anything real at all, and turns him to the more fruitful and important question, what is the nature of the real, when it is most fittingly and appropriately defined? Now it is just that question which seems to cause confusion and dilemma, and it is here that further clarification is needed. for the natural and obvious answer to the question when is reality most fittingly and appropriately defined seems to be this when it is truly defined that this answer is the cause of the greater part of current controversies about pragmatism is obvious enough it seems worth while therefore to say something about it and elicit possibly further discussion from professor dewey and others the dilemma in question is apparent
if reality as true is but one sort of reality or one sort of experience how can it possibly be affirmed that the nature of reality is most fittingly defined when we have that sort when that is reality is experienced as true the answer occasionally given that it is thus most fittingly defined because defined in a way which most usefully meets the needs which raise the demand for definition seems to many minds to be unsatisfactory The reasons for dissatisfaction vary much, from quaking fear for the possible loss of an absolute, to a genuine conviction that the whole knowing experience is a transcendent kind of experience, related to all other kinds in a way in which they are not related to it.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the pragmatist claim that 'the real is simply what is experienced' and why does Woodbridge challenge it?
0:00–17:42
2
How does Dewey define the 'knowledge experience' and its role in transforming other experiences?
17:42–1:09:07
3
Can scientific knowledge about past realities be reconciled with 'reality as experience'?
1:09:07–2:16:53
4
How does Dewey respond to McGilvary's claim that reality exists only when experienced?
2:16:53–2:30:12
5
What is the Chicago Idea debate about whether ideas are only for doubtful inquiry?
2:30:12–2:49:25
6
How does Dewey redefine the reflex arc as a circuit of coordination rather than stimulus-response?
2:49:25–4:29:15
7
How does McGilvary refute the idealist claim that perceived qualities must be merely subjective?
4:29:15–4:49:35
8
What distinctions between sensum, sentire, and sensum-sentire clarify the realism vs idealism debate?
4:49:35–6:15:12