TRIGGERnometry
Everything You Think You Know About Vietnam Is Wrong — Historian Mark Moyar
09 May 2026
Chapter 1: What historical context is essential to understand the Vietnam War?
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One of the central controversies of the war just was it something that could have been won or not. And a lot of historians, especially on the left, will say, no, this was, you could never have won it. Yes, I mean, the Americans have air power, artillery. The North Indians don't have these things. And so it is very one side. In fact, that will be the general pattern.
So they take crippling losses at the hands of American and South Vietnamese forces. They commit some terrible strategic blunders. This was not a foregone conclusion that it was gonna end the way it did. Hollywood's dramatizing things. It is, yes.
Wow.
Yes. Hollywood hasn't done a very good job on Vietnam. There's still, I think, a pretty strong feeling among the troops that this is something worth fighting for. There is also this growing realization that the politicians are tying our hands behind our back. We either need to fight this war hard or we need to get out.
at hillsdale.edu. Mark, welcome to Trigonometry. Great to be with you. Great to have you on. We're going to talk about the Vietnam War.
And as we discussed before we started, both the two of us and quite a lot of people watching this might not know very much about that war, but we feel like some of the conversations that have been happening in American society lately, there seems to be some connection with the things that happened, the conclusions that were made at that time, the impact on the collective psyche of this country.
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Chapter 2: What were the main reasons behind U.S. involvement in Vietnam?
starts aiding the French in Indochina, Vietnam, and then U.S. also goes into Korea to fight the Korean War. war and so a lot of people second guessing kind of forget about these underlying sources but i think it's you've got to fundamentally understand that there's a war against communism and this is an ideology that killed 100 million people in the 20th century which again
relevant today because you now have young people who don't really know the history saying, oh, socialism, communism are really not that big a deal. But Vietnam clearly is aimed at preventing the spread of communism and particularly Chinese-led communism in Southeast Asia. And so when the French War ends in 1954,
and the french just decide they're sick of this the united states decides it's going to help a new government in south vietnam as part of the effort to contain communism because what almost all the americans at this time thought was that this so-called domino theory meant that if you lose a place like south vietnam the other countries in the region are going to fall and that will be actually the guiding principle for for most of the war
And so we've got the domino theory. But what people probably don't know as well, Mark, is that America was financing and helping to support the French financially. I mean, they were paying billions of dollars, even back then, which was a lot of money. It's a lot of money now, but back then it was even more money.
Mm hmm. Yes. And, you know, initially, the United States was not very keen on this French effort because it was in Roosevelt and then Truman kind of thought European colonialism is kind of passe and we're not going to support it. But then when they saw this communist threat, they agreed to help the French. And the French also made promises to the Vietnamese that they could have
a greater degree of independence. It's also interesting when you get to 1954 and the French are surrounded at Dien Bien Phu, they come to the Americans and say, can you bomb the communists who have surrounded us? And Eisenhower actually goes to the British and says, we'd like you to join us in an anti-communist coalition. And the British say, well, you know, you didn't help us out in India.
So we're not really that keen on helping save the French in Indochina. And so for that reason, the United States holds its hand. Now, it creates an interesting what if. I do think had we bombed, actually, we could have perhaps saved the French. But we didn't really know that at the time.
We didn't realize the Viet Minh, the communists, as they called themselves, had committed almost their entire army to Dien Bien Phu. And we're very vulnerable. But again, we didn't know that at the time. So the U.S. then decides we're just going to hold on to the southern half. French leave, and so we support this new government in South Vietnam.
Well, the French surrender once again. What a shocker. So how do we get from this situation? The communists have the north. The American-backed non-anti-communists have the south. How do you get from that to American boots on the ground?
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Chapter 3: How did the domino theory influence American foreign policy?
And so McNamara, he comes out as one of the most disreputable people out of all of this, I think. And this is a case where he misled the American people. Do we know why he did it? I think he just felt that it might get a little too messy if people knew that there was some gray areas in here, that maybe this was not purely unprovoked aggression.
And again, that also wouldn't probably look great with the election coming up. But we do know Lyndon Johnson and McNamara, they are already talking about bombing North Vietnam in 1965, even when publicly they're trying to claim that they're not going to send American boys. So there is a great amount of deceit.
In fact, Johnson's advisers come to him several times in 1964 and say, you know, we've actually got a pretty bad rap Democrats because we had Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt
uh promised they were going to keep us out of war and then they get us into war and we could be heading down that road this way so we may be fighting a war so you might not want to talk about being the peace guy but he ignores them and keeps going on this so uh it is a you know a rather sorry uh aspect of the conflict and um do you think there's any truth to the idea that actually there were some forces that really did want this war to escalate within the american administration at the time
there are some who see that it's probably going to happen and there's a big debate within between the ones who are in the mcnamara camp who binds these academic theories and they think they can kind of keep this as a limited war and then it's going to continue now the joint chiefs of staff and others in the military say
you know, that doesn't make any sense if we either need to fight this war hard or we need to get out. And so that undercurrent was running for the next several years. And for the most part, you know, McNamara is the number one guy. So he largely prevails. And so he pushes this idea that we're going to fight a limited conflict rather than going all out or getting out.
So 1965, when was the moment American boots hit Vietnamese soil?
So the first American troops come ashore in March of 1965. And at that point, the situation is continuing to get worse in the South. And the American that said Johnson is already thinking about doing some bombing, but he thinks that they can bomb the North, but it's going to kind of keep on up. somewhat modest pace. They don't know that this big invasion is coming.
So they send these first troops thinking that they're just there to guard American bases. They're not there to actually get into the fighting. But what happens then is May of 65, the North Vietnamese, these divisions that have coming from the North, they launch a big offensive. And by June, it's clear that South Vietnam is probably gonna fall unless the Americans get in.
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Chapter 4: What were the key turning points in the Vietnam War?
jianbian food we know the chinese had sent a thousand trucks to help the vietnam win there and so uh the chinese do see this as a major front in dominating asia pushing the united states out as a uh as a major power but the soviets are also there and the americans know the soviets and the chinese aren't on board but this american intervention actually sort of widens the soviet sign of soviet split because
What happens when the Americans come in, the Vietnamese turn to the Soviets for anti-aircraft weapons because there's so much American air power. And so when they start getting more from the Soviets, the Chinese start getting jealous and you start to see a falling out. And then you have the Cultural Revolution in China.
And so eventually the Soviets will become the principal benefactor of the North Vietnamese.
So 1965, boots on the ground. At the beginning, the Americans were making inroads, high fives all round, kicking commie ass. When did it start to turn?
Well, for the troops themselves, they're still pretty motivated for several years now. Robert McNamara himself starts to become disillusioned at the end of 65. And this is one of the reasons why he's so unpopular is that he's actually now having doubts, but he's not talking too much about them. So a lot of people say, well,
He should have maybe resigned or maybe told people that we had to do something different. But the reason he gets discouraged is that when the troops go in the middle of 1965, he is still believing that we have these limited war theories that tell us that one side restrains itself and the other side will restrain itself.
Well, the Americans limit themselves, but late 1965, they find out North Vietnamese are sending in a whole bunch more people. And so this theory has been essentially destroyed. And so now McNamara realizes that it's not going to work and the war is getting bigger and bigger and he can't really figure out a way out of it. Now you have the military in this point continuing to say,
We need to either invade Laos, invade North Vietnam, bomb in a much more powerful fashion. But the war will continue to go pretty well for the Americans for the next several years. And there's still... I think a pretty strong feeling among the troops that this is something worth fighting for.
But there is also this growing realization that the politicians are tying our hands behind our back and not letting us win this conflict. And that will increasingly become the sentiment of American troops.
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Chapter 5: What role did media representation play in shaping public perception of the Vietnam War?
And so there again, you know, people that you have an opportunity to capitalize on this, you know, let's win the war sentiment. But instead, he decides he doesn't want to do that. And, you know, he ends up dropping out of the presidential race, partly because of Vietnam, partly for other reasons.
So reading between the lines of everything you're saying, my sense, and correct me if I'm wrong, is your perspective is You either don't fight, or if you do fight, you fight to win. And the reason that the Vietnam War ended up not being a success is Lyndon Johnson, McNamara, they tried to sit on two stools and end up falling in between them. Is that a fair assessment?
Yes, there's certainly, I think, a lot of truth to that. Now, there is there were other opportunities, too, I think, because one of the central controversies of the war just was it something that could have been won or not. And a lot of historians, especially on the left, will say, no, this was you can never have won it again, I think.
The Americans could have gone North Vietnam and maybe there was still been some resistance, but it would have been a much more manageable problem or that we could have cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But you also do have towards the end of the war, the U.S. decides to cut off aid to South Vietnam. But South Vietnam is actually getting better over time. And so that was another problem.
missed opportunity. And then the one other huge missed opportunity was this coup in 1963. I think had we not done that and sort of torn the government apart, it never would have gotten to the level that it gets to.
And why does America cut off aid to Southampton now?
Because Congress is getting fed up with the war. It's also happens coincides with Watergate. And so Congress is getting angry at Nixon. Nixon has promised that he'll go help the South Vietnamese. But because of Watergate, his hands are tied and you have
increasingly large anti-war sentiment within Congress, who thinks and has a very benign view of Vietnamese communism and unduly harsh, I think, view of our Vietnamese allies.
Is that really fair, Mark? Is it possible also that because of the draft and because the people who are going to fight and die and be maimed in Vietnam are just normal people who didn't volunteer for this, who didn't want to be professional soldiers, that the sentiment among the American public at this point has already turned?
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Chapter 6: How did the Vietnam War impact American politics and society?
Is the implication it's a white man's war being fought by black, disproportionately by black people?
Well, there will be allegations made like that in around 1967. And at that point, I mean, it's interesting, too, because Previously, until the Korean War, blacks were generally kept out of the combat units. And so at least the combat units that were doing in the most difficult parts of the fighting. And so through integration, in some senses, it was an advance for now they're.
integrated in these combat units. But I don't know the exact number, something like maybe 15 to 20 percent in those first few years of the casualties were blacks at a time when they were about 12 percent of the population. So they are overrepresented. Now, after that becomes an issue, the U.S. actually changes the policy so that there is not this disparity.
And so for the war as a whole, the blacks are right around 12% of the population overall, and they're also 12% of the casualties.
Because there was a lot of talk, and it'd be good to actually delve into this, that there was a real problem with racialization, racism within the armed forces in Vietnam.
Yes, and having spent a great deal of time looking at that, I think just about anyone, any veteran will tell you that this problem was not that big of a deal once you were in the field because your life depended on cooperation. And so the real frictions all took place in the rear areas.
We had people with too much time to do, maybe 10% of American forces are actually out, the rest of them are on these support units. And so that's where, Problems are really bad. But you also see this happening all over the world where the U.S. has military bases, Germany, Korea, etc. You have this strong racial antagonism that is really corrosive starting around 1969.
And when you say starting around, I would assume that the racial antagonism is simply the legacy of the history of slavery and Jim Crow and all the rest of it in this country. Is that what's driving this or is there a new dimension? You know, you mentioned the black power movement itself.
Yeah, I do think the black power movement is sort of starting to change people's attitudes. You had, I mean, for one thing, a lot of the blacks who fight early in the war had volunteered for service. You know, a lot of them, I think, believed in sort of the vision of Martin Luther King that we want sort of a colorblind society. And, you know, of course, a lot of people
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Chapter 7: What lessons can be drawn from the Vietnam War regarding future conflicts?
You have information about the Tonkin Gulf suggesting that maybe it was not quite what we were told, that in fact there was some provocation involved. You have documents indicating that they're actually planning to go to war when Lyndon Johnson's saying that he's the peace candidate. And you have talk of... the war strategy.
And one thing we haven't talked about yet is Robert McNamara had what he called the strategy of gradual escalation. And his skin goes back to these game theories that he's pulled from academia. But he argues that when we start bombing North Vietnam in early 1965, we should start off at a low level and build up gradually.
And that's part of our plan to communicate our intent and also to limit our risk. Now, the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the same time, this also comes on Pentagon Papers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are saying, that's crazy. Let's hit them hard right away. And so and clearly the strategy of gradual escalation doesn't work.
And in fact, what happens is it gives the North Vietnamese time to build up their anti-aircraft defenses. So you have a lot of strategic incompetence being exposed here in the Pentagon Papers.
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And Mark, this takes us into the realm of Hollywood, which actually is a big part of this, but probably after the war. Well, one of the things that's been depicted in a number of movies, one of them, I think, American Gangster with Denzel Washington, is the idea that actually the Vietnam War becomes a big drug trafficking operation, and a lot of drugs are coming to the United States through that.
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Chapter 8: How do historical interpretations of the Vietnam War affect current U.S. foreign policy?
Some people get so obsessed with the deal that they just start giving things away just so they can say they struck the deal. And so what ultimately happens is. So the South Vietnamese complain. Then Kissinger goes back to the North Vietnamese and says, well, we kind of need to change what we agreed to because maybe that wasn't such a great idea.
And the North Vietnamese say, well, we're not, you already agreed to this other stuff. So then Nixon bombs them in what's called the Christmas bombing, very heavy bombing in December of 72. And Nixon easily thinks, yeah, we're going to, you know, clobber North Vietnam. They're going to be hurt for so long and, you know, they won't be able to do anything, at least not for a while.
And we're going to, you know, declare this peace agreement. And he promises the South Vietnamese that he will protect them if if the North Vietnamese, in fact, do launch another big offensive. Now, whether he was going to actually live up to that? We don't know because he's gone by 74. The South Vietnamese, you know, basically the peace never really happens.
The South Vietnamese are fighting North Vietnamese and it's going pretty well until about the middle of 74 when the American, the aid cuts by the Congress are taking effect. So now South Vietnamese don't have enough fuel for their aircraft. And to defend something like South Vietnam, you need aircraft. They don't have enough ammunition. And this gradually gets worse and worse.
And so the North Vietnamese see this and launch an offensive in Vietnam. early 75, and they kind of wait to see, too, are the Americans going to come do anything? By this time, Nixon's gone. The Americans don't do anything. And so the North Vietnamese then are able to, with 600,000 troops, defeat this depleted South Vietnamese force.
When you tell the story and you outline it like this, It does sound more and more, and something that I didn't appreciate through watching the movies, and we'll come on to that. It just sounds like political and strategic incompetence. But what you said about Kissinger, I mean, to me, that just blows my mind. I mean, this was obviously a fantastically intelligent man.
I'm not the brightest, but even I can work out leaving the enemy in the cities isn't a good idea.
Yeah, that's right. And he will catch a lot of heat. Yeah, as you said, he was a brilliant man. McNamara also, again, brilliant guy, but yet they commit some terrible strategic blunders, which, again, I think this was not a foregone conclusion that it was going to end the way it did. You had both of those guys making mistakes.
in a very terrible decision now you also had mcnamara and nixon who you know listened to these guys and then that's part of the problem is they thought well these guys are so smart they must know what they're talking about um now we do know in the case of mcnamara johnson actually near the end of his presidency concludes that mcnamara doesn't know what he's talking about because mcnamara wants to in late 67 he wants to cut the bombing because he says bombing's really not doing anything but there's so much information that says it's in fact doing things that
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