Adam Leventhal

Okay.

And so when you say challenger disaster, presumably not loss of life and property.

I really hope not.

Right.

Yeah, and then...

So then the normalization of deviance is you think that in the wake of this, it will be revealed that, oh, by the way, like internally, this was, with the Challenger disaster, lots of people, both the subcontractor that made the boosters, there was lots of people who were aware about the O-ring problem.

A lot of people knew of the temperature sensitivity to the O-rings.

There were engineers that were deeply – I mean, it's a real tragic story.

There's nothing more tragic than an engineer that is vindicated by their concerns when they are overruled with executive management and they are proven correct.

That can leave people really broken in its wake, and it did in the Challenger disaster.

Right.

So you wonder or believe, predict that in the wake of this thing, we will take this apart and realize, oh, the people at this frontier model company, wherever this disaster took place, they were aware of it.

Okay, well, I'm going to dovetail into your prediction from last year, and I'm just going to predict again that a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist uses an LLM to research this story and report it, report the inside.

But yeah, that's a dire prediction, but I think that it does feel like... Also, you have these big accidents

when we kind of collectively get over our skis and we kind of like, we know that it's possible, we don't think it's possible, and then it happens.

But on this topic.

Oh, I see what you're doing.

I see what you're doing.

It's like, I'm not the only person here, sir, who hate reads.

Let me introduce it.