Adrian Johnston

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618 appearances 1 recordings 1 series first heard Jan 2020 last heard Jan 2020

Adrian Johnston’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.

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You know, I've had a series of back and forth exchanges, very, you know, at this point, you know, hostile, you know, kind of difficult exchanges with Pippin.
You know, but I just had a lengthy essay come out in the Warwick Journal of Philosophy entitled The Difference Between Fichte's and Hegel's Systems of Philosophy, A Response to Robert Pippin.
which gets into these issues in relation to Pippin's very recent book on Hegel's logic, as well as to a lesser extent, Brandon's, uh, 800 page tome on Hegel's phenomenology that just came out earlier.
Uh, well, yeah, trust, right.
And so, and Zizek is involved in these debates too.
So this is still kind of unfolding in terms of us all fighting over Hegel's legacy and, you know, how to interpret him in different, in different ways.
Um,
But with the kind of analytic deflationary Hegelianism that is the lowest common denominator amongst figures like Taylor, Pippin, and Brandom, you might say that this would involve reading Hegel as an anti-realist who doesn't think that we can make knowledge claims, valid and legitimate knowledge claims about mind-independent reality.
You know, as an anti-materialist who wants to treat our subjectivity, our mindedness and like-mindedness, what he calls geist, spirit, as utterly separate and distinct from what we take nature to be, so pronounced anti-naturalism.
And, you know, generally to assimilate Hegel to either a kind of Kantian transcendental epistemological framework, you know, or to make Hegel a kind of social constructivist.
And so, you know, these are kind of the hallmark features of analytic deflationary Hegelianism.
And, you know, I think that it really Hegel was much more metaphysically ambitious than this sort of approach to him.
is ready, willing, and able to acknowledge.
yeah and i mean here uh you know i i thus far i i would guess my my answers have gone a little longer than than perhaps they should have but here i can be a bit briefer based on some of what we've already got on the table now um
that, for instance, deflationary Hegelianism, and especially like Pippin's variety that seeks to assimilate Hegel to the, you know, subject-centered outlooks of Kant and Fichte, that for that sort of deflationary Hegelianism, the claim would be that, well, we can never talk about, you know, reality over and above, you know, and reality as it would, you know, be, you know,
in a way where it would be to some extent independent of, or,
know, and or precede the genesis of thinking subjectivity that, you know, we are always going to be confined within the realm of a thinking, you know, that can never, you know, get beyond itself in terms of being able to talk about a form of radical objectivity or mind independence.
Um, and that, uh,
that if you accept the revolution in philosophy that is associated with German idealism starting with Kant, you come to accept that our own subjectivity in a way forms the unsurpassable horizon for everything we can think, talk, and write about as philosophers and as human beings.
And again, this would be subjectivism as a kind of anti-realism and as often inviting, for instance, if we think that our subjectivity is socially mediated or constituted, this leads into things like a kind of social constructivist perspective.
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