Adrian Johnston
speaker
618 appearances
1 recordings
1 series
first heard Jan 2020
last heard Jan 2020
Adrian Johnston’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.
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Appearances
And it's sense a la this opening chapter on quote-unquote sense-certainty.
And that for Hegel, if we take, for instance, the most simplistic, non-philosophical, even anti-intellectual standpoint and assume that, all right, here is the world just immediately disclosing itself.
And that sense would be the idea that what I register in terms of my sensory perceptual capacities
that I don't even theorize that.
I just take the contents of sense to simply be reality as it is, just there presenting itself and in sensing it, I know it and that's that.
And then Hegel proceeds in chapters two and three to show that this seemingly unproblematic, utterly unsophisticated reality
not at all philosophical, metaphysical, et cetera, naive, realist immersion in the world as disclosed by sense, it ends up having to, when it thinks through what it's trying to claim about how things are, that it's driven to adopt a very different set of attitudes towards what previously it treated as straightforward sense content.
And for Hegel,
for instance, let's take the term sense and appearance.
And indeed, we'll use this in order to address the question about appearance.
So for Hegel, there's a big difference between if I just take what I am experiencing in terms of sense as simply this is reality and it's immediately disclosed to me and it is what it is, it's self-evident, there it is, full stop.
that there's a world of difference between that versus if I treat that same experiential content as now not just the immediate disclosure of reality, but rather as a kind of mediating surface on the other side of which there is something that doesn't directly disclose itself.
So if I say, okay, sense is now instead to be viewed as, well,
there's what I sense and then there's something beyond behind or beneath what I sense that is responsible for giving rise to that sensory content.
I've shifted in terms of how I spontaneously interpret the content of my experience in terms of sense.
And now I'm dealing with sense, not as just sense, but as appearance, right?
Appearance is the idea that it's not just that, you know,
what I sense is the direct and immediate disclosure of things themselves.
I now assume that there is a distinction between things themselves and then how they show up for me, how they register that is distinct from those things themselves.
So there's the appearing and then there is what appears.
Showing 101–120 of 618 · page 6 of 31
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