Behnam Ben Taleblu

speaker
515 appearances 4 recordings 2 series first heard Apr 2026 last heard 12 Sep

Behnam Ben Taleblu’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.

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Recordings per month over the last 12 months — 4 in all, peaking in Sep 2026 with 1.

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is piece together those four things, local Iranian sources, Persian language government sources, Western English language reporting, and commercial satellite imagery to be able to get a good sense.
I think the best thing that we can point to in terms of targeting by Washington
has been two things.
One, missile facilities, depending on the commercially available satellite imagery you use and the reporting you use, anywhere from 19 to 22 to potentially even 27 missile sites have been targeted.
But targeting is not the same as destroyed because some of those that have been targeted have been able to resume fire, I think, within just a matter of days.
so that means that these facilities have not been collapsed it's just the doorways that have been collapsed or the infrastructure uh has been you know targeted but the the subterranean facility still stands that's one and two is ballistic missile production you know sites like hojir shahwood maybe parchin uh the hakimia complex those have definitely been struck and struck in a way
that Israel had not struck in October 2024 or June 2025.
So there is evidence to support what these U.S.
officials are saying, but there's not sufficient evidence in terms of numbers to take the victory lap right now.
Well, I think they're going to want, let me just put a footnote of what you said right before, which is if we're looking at the decline in the number of launches, you know, this is not to get all political science-y for a second, but I think this is a situation of equifinality, which is many reasons for one cause.
Certainly, the predominant cause, if we're making a cocktail together here, the main ingredient to that cocktail is the success of the US and Israeli strikes, particularly against the launchers, because that's one of the main bottlenecks in terms of this Iranian missile infrastructure.
You could have 5 million missiles, but if you have only two launchers, that really does impact your rate of fire, and that makes you vulnerable to the kind of strikes and the successes that America and Israel have had.
But on the flip side, the logic that we're seeing from even just Iranian military
commanders in the field, even if you pretend there is zero command and control and everything is totally localized, it's all intonation rather than coordination, if they see less missile teams coming back, if they see less TELs coming back from the field, because they have to go out of the mountain, fire the projectile, drive back to the mountain, load up the missiles, and every time they see less and less returning or they get different insight from the men who do choose to return and come back and it's fear and it's hesitation and agitation,
If you were a local commander, you're going to send less, not more out.
And I think that number for the decline, there's also a local Iranian targeting reason for that.
And the third thing is just because there's less volume does not mean there's less lethality.
One thing that we're seeing that is a continuation from the trend of the 12-day war
particularly at the last quarter or the last third of the 12-day war, which is as the missile math kicks in for both sides, interceptors for Israel, medium-range ballistic missiles for the Islamic Republic,
As that kicks in, the reason the Islamic Republic still stands to gain a short-term advantage is because the less the number of interceptors exist for Israel, for example, the more the regime actually has been able to land blows against civilian infrastructure because you have a less number of interceptors available for a wider amount of geography.
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