Brian Leiter

speaker
530 appearances 2 recordings 1 series first heard Sep 2009 last heard Sep 2010

Brian Leiter’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.

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I'd have to think about
This in being a philosopher who regularly disinvites people from reading his books.
I mean, he often says basically, this shouldn't be heard by the wrong people.
This book is only for certain kinds of readers.
I write with such a style in order to exclude certain readers from understanding what the points are.
And I take that to be of a piece with this underlying picture, which is that herd morality may be perfectly fine for the herd, but there are certain
certain peoples for whom it is profoundly deleterious, and they're the ones who have to be reached through this combination of philosophical arguments and rhetorical provocations that make up his corpus.
Yeah, I mean I think you're certainly right that he thinks that if a morality is incompatible with the flourishing, with a person's flourishing, that's a bad thing about that morality.
Now, I think we have to be careful in distinguishing between two different kinds of claims about goodness.
There are I'll preface this by saying this is a bit controversial, but you'll allow me you'll allow me the distinction for now.
Now, and maybe we'll come back to it.
There are claims about what I call in the book prudential goodness, what's good or bad for an agent, or what some philosophers call non-moral goodness, right?
That just has to do with well-being.
And so at the heart of his critique of morality in the pejorative sense is a claim about prudential goodness and badness.
It's the claim that morality in the pejorative sense is prudentially bad for higher types of human beings.
But a claim about what's good or bad for an agent, good or bad for their
Well-being isn't the only kind of claim about goodness that's at issue.
We might say that there's also a claim of, we'll just call it moral goodness.
But now treat moral here is not meaning morality in the pejorative sense, but just all other kinds of goodness that aren't non-moral goodness and aren't aesthetic goodness and so on.
And that kind of claim of moral goodness would be implicit in a statement like morality in the pejorative sense.
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