Dr. Andrew Huff

Well, and we actually dealt with this type of low probability, high consequence threat risk analysis all the time at San Diego National Laboratories.

And the big issue is what you just brought up, the human in the loop.

Usually the engineered systems, you can engineer those precisely to account for whatever probability or consequence of risk, but it's always the human problem.

Well, yes, they had a digital library at EcoHealth Alliance.

And then there's other systems that the US, or I should say, not only the United States, but the global virologist community maintain of genetic information on viruses.

Typically, we were buying negative ADC centigrade freezers as fast as we could or as many as we could afford and storing those at Columbia University and other laboratories where these things go in the freezer and they set.

And the one nice thing is if the freezer does fail, it usually destroys all the sample on the inside because they do have to be maintained cold.

In my opinion, I tend to think that it's laughable.

Laughable?

Laughable at most university laboratories.

If you were to do a red team or penetration test and me coming on the national security, being a biosecurity, biosafety expert, you could get into most university laboratories.

I heard arguments from other scientists who worked in these laboratories.

Well, you know, we have good physical security.

We have card scanners.

We have this good physical.

Oh, I mean, if you are a motivated attacker and you're well-trained, you can get into one of these laboratories.

It would not be overly difficult.

Now, has this improved and has this changed?

Are all the laboratories the same?

I mean, I think many of the BSL-3 or 4, which are the higher level or highest level laboratories in the United States, now have pretty good laboratories.