Dr. Richard Moulange
speaker
1,784 appearances
1 recordings
1 series
first heard Mar 2026
last heard 31 Mar
Dr. Richard Moulange’s voice in public audio — every appearance, attributed to the second.
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recordings per month · last 12 monthsRecordings per month over the last 12 months — 1 in all, peaking in Mar 2026 with 1.
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But as long as we can have the classifier, which is natural versus engineered, there's only a small subset of that space that is stuff that it was trained on that is existing in the world, right?
Now, of course, there might be something just outside, which is going to be a natural mutation, but anything really far away from that central bit, that's very, very different.
And so if we see an engineered pathogen, an engineered sort of pandemic virus that's
Because, and that says, okay, well, you know, because it can't have just been a little mutation.
And because it's a pandemic virus, the only reason you would deeply engineer a pandemic virus is as part of a-
And so that alone, which is robust even to the world where you can sample from the embedding space perfectly every genome under the sun, is really important because then you can go, thankfully, the Department of State's list is very short at the moment, at least publicly, on who wants to try this.
And so then you can go, okay, well, it's one of these small handful of actors, and you can bring in other aspects, particularly other intelligence signals, SIGINT, HUMINT.
I agree that the forensics attribution capability alone isn't enough, but paired with the ability to...
survey those programs, that will buy you the attribution, hopefully, even in the world where we all have Evo 7 and it can generate anything you want.
I think your essay point is a really good pushback, but I want to point out that this capability is still partially robust.
Yes and no.
I really want to be open to...
weird false flag attacks.
I really want to be open to possibilities that you would deliberately try to obscure who would release things or incriminate others.
I would also note, I think we can learn from the cyber offense domain.
More and more states work through intermediaries in the cyber domain.
Yes, you might have...
the cyber unit of military intelligence of a country running cyber offense attacks.
But also you have lots of sort of classic cyber criminal groups who are actually as powerful as top, as good states on certain operations who can do things.
And that gives you a layer of separation and a layer of...
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