Ezra Klein

If we can tariff them at any moment and will at any whim, they will try to unwind themselves from being part of our architecture of financial dominance. And it is an extraordinary source of American power. But if you use it too much... then people will voluntarily release themselves from it because they are voluntarily part of it. China's very, very sophisticated payment structures.

If we can tariff them at any moment and will at any whim, they will try to unwind themselves from being part of our architecture of financial dominance. And it is an extraordinary source of American power. But if you use it too much... then people will voluntarily release themselves from it because they are voluntarily part of it. China's very, very sophisticated payment structures.

It has the capacity to lend a lot of money. It is playing itself up right now as a more stable player in international affairs. It is trying to create closer relationships with Europe, with Japan, with South Korea, with a lot of people and countries that it is traditionally had very rough relationships with. And so I don't think we're necessarily going to rise and fall together.

It has the capacity to lend a lot of money. It is playing itself up right now as a more stable player in international affairs. It is trying to create closer relationships with Europe, with Japan, with South Korea, with a lot of people and countries that it is traditionally had very rough relationships with. And so I don't think we're necessarily going to rise and fall together.

I mean, if you told me that Trump was a Manchurian candidate and you had evidence of it, it would be very hard for me to refute. Like, what would the Manchurian candidate do if not this? Right.

I mean, if you told me that Trump was a Manchurian candidate and you had evidence of it, it would be very hard for me to refute. Like, what would the Manchurian candidate do if not this? Right.

So I want to note something that I think is a useful way of thinking about trade here, that I think there's been this problem that people keep trying to illustrate a more sophisticated architecture around Donald Trump's thinking than is actually there.

So I want to note something that I think is a useful way of thinking about trade here, that I think there's been this problem that people keep trying to illustrate a more sophisticated architecture around Donald Trump's thinking than is actually there.

And one of the things they'll reach for is this issue with China. China makes about a third of the world's goods, as you mentioned. They're on track to make about 45 percent of it in the 2030s. And if I'm remembering the number right, I think they account for something like 12% of consumption. Yeah, 12, 13%. Now, that's hugely imbalanced.

And one of the things they'll reach for is this issue with China. China makes about a third of the world's goods, as you mentioned. They're on track to make about 45 percent of it in the 2030s. And if I'm remembering the number right, I think they account for something like 12% of consumption. Yeah, 12, 13%. Now, that's hugely imbalanced.

For a country that big to be that imbalanced between production and consumption creates an instability across the entire global system, right?

For a country that big to be that imbalanced between production and consumption creates an instability across the entire global system, right?

One of the completely idiotic things that even skeptics of our relationship with China have been appalled by that the Trump trade effort has attempted is to treat everything in terms of bilateral trade between America and other countries as if we should have a balanced trade account with Vietnam. What do we make with our advanced manufacturing that the Vietnamese are going to buy if

One of the completely idiotic things that even skeptics of our relationship with China have been appalled by that the Trump trade effort has attempted is to treat everything in terms of bilateral trade between America and other countries as if we should have a balanced trade account with Vietnam. What do we make with our advanced manufacturing that the Vietnamese are going to buy if

It's a completely insane way to look at the world. But you do want to think, particularly in the very, very, very big players, about global imbalances. Because if there are huge global imbalances, not just like individual bilateral ones, like then you have a bit of a problem. Yes. And this is where you might have imagined the world to put pressure on China.

It's a completely insane way to look at the world. But you do want to think, particularly in the very, very, very big players, about global imbalances. Because if there are huge global imbalances, not just like individual bilateral ones, like then you have a bit of a problem. Yes. And this is where you might have imagined the world to put pressure on China.

Not that they need to manufacture less, but they need to consume more. More of their manufacturing needs to be consumed domestically. And then more of their capacity needs to be shared with the rest of the world to maintain access to these markets. But this idea that we're going to infuriate every other country along the way. It's just a very strange way to think about power.

Not that they need to manufacture less, but they need to consume more. More of their manufacturing needs to be consumed domestically. And then more of their capacity needs to be shared with the rest of the world to maintain access to these markets. But this idea that we're going to infuriate every other country along the way. It's just a very strange way to think about power.

When your biggest fear is that China is becoming a compelling alternative to you, you're going to make yourself a less compelling alternative to them, to the rest of the world.

When your biggest fear is that China is becoming a compelling alternative to you, you're going to make yourself a less compelling alternative to them, to the rest of the world.