Fareed Zakaria

Since 1945, there have been practically none. You have an open international economy. You have free trade. You have rules. You have travel and patents. I mean, there's a huge area of kind of international cooperation that people don't think about, but that happens all the time, every day, you know, when you fly, when goods go from one place to another.

And what Trump, I think, has taken from that whole world is the US has been the sucker. The US has been the country that's had to underwrite it. The US is the country that's opened itself up to the world and everyone takes advantage of the US. So I don't know that he wants to tear it down, but he wants to seriously renegotiate or perhaps even redo that system.

And what Trump, I think, has taken from that whole world is the US has been the sucker. The US has been the country that's had to underwrite it. The US is the country that's opened itself up to the world and everyone takes advantage of the US. So I don't know that he wants to tear it down, but he wants to seriously renegotiate or perhaps even redo that system.

Yeah, there is a certain truth to that, that the United States does have enormous power. And by the way, they're even right about the fact that the United States is more open to, for example, the world's goods and services than they are to ours. The United States has long practiced a kind of asymmetrical free trade. So after World War II, we decided we would open up our markets globally.

Yeah, there is a certain truth to that, that the United States does have enormous power. And by the way, they're even right about the fact that the United States is more open to, for example, the world's goods and services than they are to ours. The United States has long practiced a kind of asymmetrical free trade. So after World War II, we decided we would open up our markets globally.

to Europe and East Asia, to Japan and South Korea. And the reason we did that was we were trying to build an international system where everyone benefited, where there really wasn't that feeling of beggar thy neighbor, zero-sum game, where everyone went into a competitive spiral, which then ends up in nationalism and war. We were trying to build something different. And we thought, you know,

to Europe and East Asia, to Japan and South Korea. And the reason we did that was we were trying to build an international system where everyone benefited, where there really wasn't that feeling of beggar thy neighbor, zero-sum game, where everyone went into a competitive spiral, which then ends up in nationalism and war. We were trying to build something different. And we thought, you know,

We can be a little generous here. Let's let everyone grow and we'll do fine in the process. And of course, the data is overwhelming. Yes, Europe and Japan and South Korea and places like that grew, but the United States absolutely dominated the world. Because it's a classic, positive sum game.

We can be a little generous here. Let's let everyone grow and we'll do fine in the process. And of course, the data is overwhelming. Yes, Europe and Japan and South Korea and places like that grew, but the United States absolutely dominated the world. Because it's a classic, positive sum game.

We created a much larger global economy, much larger trading system, huge capital flows, and we were at the center of it. The dollar was the reserve currency of the world, which alone gives us incredible advantages. You know, we're the only country that doesn't have to worry that much about debt and deficits because we know that at the end of the day, the dollar is the reserve currency.

We created a much larger global economy, much larger trading system, huge capital flows, and we were at the center of it. The dollar was the reserve currency of the world, which alone gives us incredible advantages. You know, we're the only country that doesn't have to worry that much about debt and deficits because we know that at the end of the day, the dollar is the reserve currency.

And my feeling is if you take that system and say, OK, we're going to look at each bilateral relationship and see if we can squeeze this country for a slightly better deal, you probably will get a better deal. But two things will happen. The first thing is you will end up fracturing your alliances because the people with whom you have the most leverage are your allies.

And my feeling is if you take that system and say, OK, we're going to look at each bilateral relationship and see if we can squeeze this country for a slightly better deal, you probably will get a better deal. But two things will happen. The first thing is you will end up fracturing your alliances because the people with whom you have the most leverage are your allies.

We have more leverage with Canada than we have with Russia because Canada depends on us for security. Canada trades with us a lot. Its economy is intricately tied to the U.S. economy. So you can bully Canada. You can't really bully Russia that much because we don't do much trade with them. You can't bully China. It's another vast continental economy that can survive just fine.

We have more leverage with Canada than we have with Russia because Canada depends on us for security. Canada trades with us a lot. Its economy is intricately tied to the U.S. economy. So you can bully Canada. You can't really bully Russia that much because we don't do much trade with them. You can't bully China. It's another vast continental economy that can survive just fine.

So the result of Trump inaction, the Trump doctrine inaction, has been a war on America's allies. But the second more important part is, yeah, you'll gain a little bit here and there by getting slightly better tariff deals. And just so people understand, tariffs in the industrialized world are around 3%. They're very, very low. So the idea, you know, we're not getting penalized in any large ways.

So the result of Trump inaction, the Trump doctrine inaction, has been a war on America's allies. But the second more important part is, yeah, you'll gain a little bit here and there by getting slightly better tariff deals. And just so people understand, tariffs in the industrialized world are around 3%. They're very, very low. So the idea, you know, we're not getting penalized in any large ways.

You can cherry pick a few examples to the contrary, but mostly among the liberal democratic states of the world, it's a free trade war. But what you will do by squeezing each of these individual countries, humiliating them, making them, forcing them to accept renegotiation of terms,

You can cherry pick a few examples to the contrary, but mostly among the liberal democratic states of the world, it's a free trade war. But what you will do by squeezing each of these individual countries, humiliating them, making them, forcing them to accept renegotiation of terms,

You lose the kind of relationships that you had built over eight decades that created this extraordinary anchor of stability in the world, which was the Western alliance. And, you know, the gains are not that great.