Fareed Zakaria

I would guess that America first for Trump and for many of his followers. And again, I wouldn't put some of the ideologists of MAGA in the same category. But I think for Trump, it's the idea that the United States has been constrained for too long

by globalism, by worrying about the international environment, by worrying about all these alliances constrained by these international organizations, that, again, we've been the sucker, that what America first means is we're going to break through all that bullshit and we're just going to do what's good for America.

by globalism, by worrying about the international environment, by worrying about all these alliances constrained by these international organizations, that, again, we've been the sucker, that what America first means is we're going to break through all that bullshit and we're just going to do what's good for America.

But what is left undefined, as you're saying, is, well, what is good for America? Why would it be good for America to break apart the international trading system? Why would it be good for America to break apart this world it's created? So that part, I think, is undefined. But you can see the impulse and what the attraction is to a lot of people.

But what is left undefined, as you're saying, is, well, what is good for America? Why would it be good for America to break apart the international trading system? Why would it be good for America to break apart this world it's created? So that part, I think, is undefined. But you can see the impulse and what the attraction is to a lot of people.

A lot of people who have always felt that the United States, by the way, run by this elite cabal of urban liberals, overeducated urban liberals in places like New York and Washington, has been selling America out. This was basically, if you think of the 1950s, this was the McCarthy attack in many ways. So I think in some ways it's a hearkening back to that idea.

A lot of people who have always felt that the United States, by the way, run by this elite cabal of urban liberals, overeducated urban liberals in places like New York and Washington, has been selling America out. This was basically, if you think of the 1950s, this was the McCarthy attack in many ways. So I think in some ways it's a hearkening back to that idea.

Yeah, I think you have it exactly right. And in a way, he has a kind of fascination, not just with America, I think, in the 19th century in the way exactly the way you described, but also in kind of geopolitics of the 19th century to the extent that I think he understands it, which is, you know, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must, to quote Thucydides. And that idea that

Yeah, I think you have it exactly right. And in a way, he has a kind of fascination, not just with America, I think, in the 19th century in the way exactly the way you described, but also in kind of geopolitics of the 19th century to the extent that I think he understands it, which is, you know, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must, to quote Thucydides. And that idea that

We are powerful. We should be unconstrained. It's very familiar in a sense. That's what the Chinese foreign minister said at a meeting of ASEAN nations where he was telling, I think it was the Philippines or the Singaporeans, you know, you've got to understand we are big and powerful. You are not dangerous. We're going to tell you what to do. Obviously, it is the way Putin views the world.

We are powerful. We should be unconstrained. It's very familiar in a sense. That's what the Chinese foreign minister said at a meeting of ASEAN nations where he was telling, I think it was the Philippines or the Singaporeans, you know, you've got to understand we are big and powerful. You are not dangerous. We're going to tell you what to do. Obviously, it is the way Putin views the world.

That's why I think he has a much more benign view of Putin's desire to have a sphere of influence, a kind of a group of satellite states around him, including Ukraine. He has a much more benign view, I think, of Chinese expansionism. He very rarely criticizes it. I can't remember him ever doing it.

That's why I think he has a much more benign view of Putin's desire to have a sphere of influence, a kind of a group of satellite states around him, including Ukraine. He has a much more benign view, I think, of Chinese expansionism. He very rarely criticizes it. I can't remember him ever doing it.

And so then he looks at it and says, well, the United States should similarly have that kind of sense of the Monroe Doctrine, the Western Hemisphere. Again, to me, it misses the sort of central point about the transformation of the international system after World War II, which is that you realized you don't need territory to become rich and powerful and incredibly effective in the world.

And so then he looks at it and says, well, the United States should similarly have that kind of sense of the Monroe Doctrine, the Western Hemisphere. Again, to me, it misses the sort of central point about the transformation of the international system after World War II, which is that you realized you don't need territory to become rich and powerful and incredibly effective in the world.

Look at South Korea. South Korea is, I forget now, 15 times the per capita GDP of North Korea. Look at tiny Israel, which is now essentially an advanced industrial country on a tiny spit of land. Think about all the richest and most powerful countries in the world. Land acquisition has almost nothing to do with, you know, who has a lot of land? Russia.

Look at South Korea. South Korea is, I forget now, 15 times the per capita GDP of North Korea. Look at tiny Israel, which is now essentially an advanced industrial country on a tiny spit of land. Think about all the richest and most powerful countries in the world. Land acquisition has almost nothing to do with, you know, who has a lot of land? Russia.

It feels to me like a kind of bizarre, anachronistic way to look at the world. But I agree with you. That is the way he's thinking about it. You could get whatever minerals you wanted to get out of Greenland by just signing a couple of deals with them. You don't actually need to own it. You could redo the Panama Canal Treaty and be much easier, by the way, to let the Panamanians run it.

It feels to me like a kind of bizarre, anachronistic way to look at the world. But I agree with you. That is the way he's thinking about it. You could get whatever minerals you wanted to get out of Greenland by just signing a couple of deals with them. You don't actually need to own it. You could redo the Panama Canal Treaty and be much easier, by the way, to let the Panamanians run it.

And you've just, you know, kind of renegotiated it in terms you like. But I think for Trump, part of it is this kind of old-fashioned view. And part of it is I do think at the end of the day, there's a strong element of narcissism that infuses everything that Trump does. And I think he loves the idea that he would be able to put his stamp on history by saying, you know, Trump added...